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SUBTLE BUT PERVASIVE:  DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST MOTHERS & PREGNANT WOMEN IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
Alison A. Reuter*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Laurie Anne Freeman, a world-renowned expert on information 
technology and Japanese politics and a professor in the Political Science 
Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara, received 
extremely positive reviews from her department until she had two 
daughters and took leaves to be with them.1  The reviews she received after 
returning from her leaves were increasingly critical of her research and 
productivity.2  Despite family-friendly university policies, including rules 
that prohibited consideration of leave time when evaluating productivity, 
the department repeatedly evaluated her earlier than scheduled and 
compared her unfavorably with professors who had not taken leaves.3  
When Freeman came up for tenure, she had an impressive list of 
accomplishments including two prestigious fellowships, one book 
published and one under contract, and invitations to present her work at 
leading institutions including Harvard and Stanford.4  Overwhelmingly 
negative assessments from her department, however, culminated in a 
unanimous recommendation to deny tenure.5
 
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.A., Middlebury College, 
2002.  I would like to thank Professor Craig Gurian for his suggestions and assistance in 
writing this Comment.  I would also like to thank my husband, Michael Reuter, my parents, 
Joan and Bill Hertel, and the rest of my family and friends for their support and 
encouragement. 
  But that was not the end of 
 1. See Charlotte Fishman, “Teetering on the Family-friendly Edge”: Discrimination 
Against Mothers in Academia, COMMON DREAMS, Sept. 25, 2005, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0925-21.htm; Scott Jaschik, Faux Family-
friendly?, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Sept. 15, 2005, 
http://insidehighered.com/news/2005/09/15/ucsb. 
 2. See Fishman, supra note 1. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
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the road for Freeman.6
The Chancellor sent Freeman’s case back to the Political Science 
Department for a new tenure review.
 
7  Again, the department attacked her 
scholarly work.8  This time, however, the Chancellor could not overlook 
the overwhelmingly positive assessment of experts in her field and her 
outstanding résumé.9  The Chancellor granted her tenure.10  Freeman was 
not satisfied; she filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging that her 
decisions to have children and to use the university’s family-friendly policy 
were the real reasons for her tenure denial.11  On September 6, 2005, 
Freeman was granted a rare EEOC cause determination.12  Charlotte 
Fishman, Freeman’s lawyer, said that she thought the cause determination 
was important because it drew attention to the sex-plus discrimination that 
women face in academia.13
Despite legislation designed to promote equality for women and mothers 
in the workplace, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), discrimination persists.  Role-
reinforcing stereotypes
  Sex-plus discrimination, however, is not 
limited to academia.  Freeman’s story highlights the discrimination that 
women face in the workplace, even at so-called family-friendly institutions. 
14 and the male-centric job model15
 
 6. See id. 
 continue to 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Jaschik, supra note 1.  Sex-plus claims are premised upon discrimination 
“against subclasses of women, distinguished not simply by gender but by an additional 
characteristic such as weight or marital or parental status.”  Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and 
the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2495 (1994). 
 14. Role-reinforcing stereotypes of women include women as caregivers, nurturers, and 
domestics.  See Mary Romero, Bursting the Foundational Myths of Reproductive Labor 
Under Capitalism: A Call for Brave New Families or Brave New Villages?, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 185 (2000) (“Cultural beliefs are reinforced by structuring 
women’s roles accordingly in institutions other than the family.  Everyday practices in 
school, church, government, and the economy reinforce values and beliefs about women’s 
inherent ability to nurture and care.  This includes continued support for the gendered 
division of labor.”). 
 15. The workplace is structured around an “ideal worker” who has no childcare 
responsibilities, is able to work a minimum of forty hours per week year round, and can 
work overtime with little or no notice.  See Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: 
Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 
310 (2004).  The current workplace model, the male-centric job model, is centered on an 
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constrain women.  The existing statutes are in large part narrowly applied 
by the courts and, as written, are insufficient to curtail the problem.  The 
passage of the PDA acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination is a 
problem and began to roll back the paternalistic treatment of pregnant 
women,16 but the PDA has not significantly alleviated the problem of 
pregnancy discrimination.  It has been construed narrowly so that in many 
jurisdictions it covers only discrimination arising from pregnancy itself, as 
distinct from its side effects.17  And the PDA does not grapple with many 
fundamental issues necessary to secure equality for women in the 
workplace and at home, such as how to structure the provision of childcare 
and breast-feeding.  Women can attempt to pursue these claims as sex-plus 
claims under Title VII, but that route has proven to be generally 
unsuccessful.18
According to one possible indicator, the number of charges filed with the 
EEOC, pregnancy discrimination is on the rise.
  Thus, many women are left unprotected from 
discrimination in the workplace based on their status as mothers, childcare 
providers, and producers of breast milk. 
19
 
outdated version of the nuclear family.  See id. 
  With more than sixty-
 16. Scott Caplan-Cotenoff has noted the PDA’s effects, writing that 
[e]nactment of the PDA undermines the employer’s assumption that women will 
leave the workforce upon becoming pregnant. . . . By placing pregnancy-related 
disability on the same footing as all other workplace disabilities, the PDA helps to 
equalize the status of female and male workers.  Therefore, in theory, the PDA 
positively affects society, as it lends credence to the view that women, like men, 
may have both a career and a family if they so desire. 
Scott A. Caplan-Cotenoff, Note and Comment, Parental Leave: The Need for a National 
Policy to Foster Sexual Equality, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 71, 79-80 (1987). 
 17. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 18. See, e.g., Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 213-14 (D. Conn. 2004) 
(denying plaintiff’s sex-plus claim); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying breast-feeding plaintiff’s sex-plus claim because plaintiff was not 
similarly situated to male employees as required for a prima facie case of sex-plus 
discrimination). 
 19. See U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAS COMBINED: FY 1992 – FY 2004, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
PREGNANCY STATS]; see also Stephanie Armour, Pregnant Workers Report Growing 
Discrimination, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2005, at 1B, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm#. 
In FY2002, the EEOC and state FEPAs received 4,714 charges alleging 
pregnancy discrimination—39% more than the 3,385 charges filed in 1992.  In the 
same year, the EEOC resolved 4,778 pregnancy discrimination charges and 
recovered $10 million in monetary awards for charging parties and other 
aggrieved individuals (not including monetary benefits obtained through 
litigation).  Many claimants also filed lawsuits against their employers in court, 
but . . . such lawsuits are extremely difficult for employees to win. 
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eight million women in the workforce, including 72.9 percent of women 
with children under age eighteen,20 in recent years the EEOC has seen a 
thirty-five percent increase in the number of pregnancy discrimination 
charges filed when compared with the number of charges filed in 1992,21 
even though the United States has seen a nine percent reduction in its birth 
rate.22  One reason for the rise in charges is that more women are in the 
workforce today than when the PDA was passed.  In 2003, women 
comprised forty-seven percent of the total labor force, with a labor force 
participation rate of 59.5 percent (meaning that 59.5 percent of women at 
least sixteen years old were working or seeking employment).23  Nearly 
three-quarters of mothers are in the workforce, including most women with 
very young children.24  A second factor is that today more women work 
during their pregnancies and work further into their pregnancies.25  In the 
decade before the PDA was passed, more than half of employed women 
quit their jobs when they learned they were pregnant.26  But by the early 
1990s the number of women who quit their jobs in anticipation of 
childbirth dropped to 26.9 percent.27  Another factor that may have 
influenced the rise in charges is that a sluggish economy has pushed 
employers to lay off workers and stress productivity.28  Accompanying the 
rise in pregnancy discrimination cases is a growing number of cases 
challenging discrimination against mothers and fathers based on their 
childcare responsibilities.29  Such challenges are generally raised under 
Title VII.30
This Comment examines discrimination against mothers in the 
workplace, including discrimination against women on the basis of 
 
 
NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WOMEN AT WORK: LOOKING BEHIND THE NUMBERS: 
40 YEARS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 13 (2004) (citations omitted), available 
at 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/CivilRightsAffAction/WomenAtWork
CRA40thAnnReport.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN AT WORK]. 
 20. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 12. 
 21. This statistic was derived by taking the difference between the average of the 
number of charges from 2002 to 2005 (4581) and the number of charges in 1992 (3385) and 
dividing it by the number of charges in 1992.  PREGNANCY STATS, supra note 19. 
 22. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 12. 
 23. See id. at 2. 
 24. See id. at 3. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Armour, supra note 19, at 1B. 
 29. See WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 13. 
 30. See id. 
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pregnancy, childcare, and breast-feeding, and proposes that new legislation 
is necessary in order to create equal opportunities for men and women, at 
work and at home.  This new legislation, the Parental Discrimination Act, 
would specifically try to remedy the embedded assumptions and biases that 
lie beneath discrimination against pregnant women and mothers.  Until the 
embedded assumptions and biases that form the basis for the current work-
family structure are eradicated, women and men will not be able to enjoy 
equal opportunities both at work and at home.  Part I of this Comment lays 
out the history of discrimination against pregnant women and mothers at 
work, and examines the legislation designed to promote equality between 
men and women in the workplace, focusing on Title VII (sex-plus cases 
and the PDA).  It then looks at Title VII decisions to discern the state of the 
law and note the areas where pregnant women and mothers are not 
protected from discrimination.  Part II contrasts the current status of the law 
with the proposals of various legal theorists and offers a critique of the 
effects of the current statutory framework.  Part III suggests an accounting 
of the holes in the statutory framework and proposes new legislation to 
stiffen the protections given to pregnant women and mothers in the 
workplace. 
I.  THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AND MOTHERS 
A. A Brief History of Mothers & Pregnant Women in the Workplace 
Throughout history women have enjoyed fewer legal rights and career 
opportunities than men; historically a woman’s chief profession was to be a 
wife and mother.31  In Bradwell v. Illinois32 in 1873 and Muller v. 
Oregon33 in 1908, the Supreme Court upheld state laws limiting the types 
of jobs women could perform and the number of hours they could work in 
part because there was a governmental interest in promoting women’s 
maternal functions and because those maternal functions were incompatible 
with the workplace.34
 
 31. See Women’s Int’l Ctr., Women’s History in America, 
http://www.wic.org/misc/history.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
  And even with time, the idea that a woman (and in 
particular a pregnant woman) belonged at home with her children did not 
fade away.  In the 1950s some states created disability insurance programs 
to provide partial wage replacement to temporarily disabled workers, but 
 32. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 33. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on a woman’s workday based on the 
dependent nature of women and the need for healthy women to serve as mothers). 
 34. See Saranna Thornton, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, SLOAN WORK AND FAMILY 
RESEARCH NETWORK, Jan. 2005, http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/encyclopedia_entry.php?id=272. 
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these programs either excluded pregnancy or provided only restricted 
pregnancy benefits.35  Before Congress passed the PDA, it was not 
uncommon for pregnant employees to be fired, demoted, forced to take an 
unpaid leave, or denied leave entirely.36
Today, however, nearly thirty years after the PDA was passed, 
pregnancy discrimination persists and discrimination against parents due to 
their childcare responsibilities is on the rise, as evidenced by the EEOC 
statistics cited in the Introduction.
 
37  Underneath this continued pattern of 
discrimination lie enduring stereotypes about pregnant women and 
mothers.38  Research shows that women who become pregnant are viewed 
as less competent in the workplace.39  Women who adopt more flexible 
schedules are also viewed as less competent.40  And new “momism” 
dictates that in order to succeed at motherhood a mother must dedicate her 
entire life to taking care of her children, placing the bar for mothers so high 
that it cannot be reached.41
B. The Emergence of Legislative Protections for Working Women: 
  These stereotypes and others can be seen in 
many pregnancy discrimination cases and even in the legislation designed 
to halt pregnancy discrimination.  They will be explored more fully in Part 
II of this Comment. 
Title VII, the PDA, & the FMLA42
In 1964 Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, providing 
protections against employment discrimination based on race, color, 
 
 
 35. See Caplan-Cotenoff, supra note 16, at 74. 
 36. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 25 
Years Later: Pregnancy Discrimination Persists, 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/WorkplaceDiscrimination/Pregnancy2
5thAnnivFacts.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006); Thornton, supra note 34. 
 37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Joan C. Williams, Women’s Work is Never Done: Employment, Family, and 
Activism: Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
365, 383-84 (2004). 
 39. See id. at 388 (referring to Jane Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in 
Performance Appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649, 650-55 (1993)); see also infra notes 308-
12, 320 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Williams, supra note 38, at 388. 
 41. See Karen S. Peterson, Motherhood, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at 6D, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-02-24-motherhood-usat_x.htm; infra notes 
261-67 and accompanying text. 
 42. This paper focuses on Title VII claims, however, discrimination claims can also be 
brought as Equal Protection Clause claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  See, e.g., Back 
v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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national origin, religion, and sex.43  The inclusion of sex discrimination in 
the Act was a last minute decision and due in large part to a successful fight 
by women’s rights advocates.44  Following the Act’s passage, women’s 
rights advocates worked to ensure vigorous enforcement of it by the 
EEOC.45  Women began to pursue Title VII claims, and their successes and 
disappointments paved the way for the development of sex discrimination 
jurisprudence to date.46
The two aspects of Title VII most relevant to an examination of 
discrimination claims based on pregnancy, motherhood, and childcare are 
sex-plus cases and cases filed under the PDA.  Sex-plus claims are 
premised upon discrimination “against subclasses of women, distinguished 
not simply by gender but by an additional characteristic such as weight or 
marital or parental status.”
 
47  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the 
Supreme Court recognized the viability of sex-plus claims.48
 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964). 
  The Court 
reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment for 
  The two types of gender discrimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.  See Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender, and 
Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 877 (2005).  This Note deals mainly with 
disparate treatment claims.  “[D]isparate treatment claims allege different treatment 
‘because of’ or ‘based on’ gender, without an overt gender-based policy.  Employers must 
have intentionally disfavored women (or pregnant women).”  See id.  Disparate treatment 
claims can be proven by direct evidence or indirectly using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting analysis.  See id. at 877. 
  Because direct evidence is so rare, the McDonnell Douglas framework for indirect 
proof is most often used.  To create a prima facie case, 
[t]he plaintiff must show (1) that she belongs to the protected class (e.g., female or 
pregnant); (2) that she performed her duties satisfactorily; (3) that she suffered an 
adverse employment action; and finally, (4) (in most circuits) that similarly 
situated employees not in the protected class (e.g., non-pregnant women) received 
better treatment.  If successful, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to 
offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action.  The ultimate burden of 
persuasion remains with the plaintiff.  A defendant can escape liability if it can 
show a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the business. 
Id. at 877-78. 
  In disparate impact claims, there is no intent requirement, but the plaintiff must 
show that a facially neutral policy caused disproportionate harm to a particular class of 
employees.  See id.  The burden of persuasion is also on the plaintiff to show that the 
application of the policy cannot be justified by business necessity.  See id. 
 44. See WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 1. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Abrams, supra note 13, at 2495.  To succeed on a sex-plus claim, the plaintiff must 
compare her treatment to a corresponding subclass of men with the same characteristic.  
Eldredge, supra note 43, at 879. 
 48. See 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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the employer where the plaintiff alleged discrimination based on an 
employer’s rule prohibiting mothers of pre-school aged children from 
holding certain positions.49  Treating mothers with young children 
differently than fathers with young children, without the presence of a bona 
fide occupational qualification, constituted sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII.50
Initially Title VII did not include the PDA.  Congress enacted the PDA 
primarily in response to a series of Supreme Court rulings: Geduldig v. 
Aiello,
 
51 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,52 and Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty.53 54  In Geduldig, an Equal Protection case, the Court held that 
California’s decision not to insure the risk of disability from normal 
pregnancy did not constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.55
[t]he California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit 
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical 
condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.  While 
it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that 
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based 
classification.
  Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held 
56
Justice Rehnquist quoted heavily from Geduldig when writing his majority 
opinion in Gilbert.
 
57
In Gilbert, the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related 
disabilities from General Electric’s disability plan did not constitute sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.
 
58
 
 49. See id. at 543-44. 
  Justices Brennan and Stevens 
wrote spirited dissents, rejecting the majority’s contention that pregnancy 
 50. See id. 
 51. 417 U.S. 484 (1975). 
 52. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 53. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
 54. See Caplan-Cotenoff, supra note 16, at 75-78; Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in 
the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 485 n.101 (2001).  Prior 
to these three cases, the lower courts had debated whether or not pregnancy discrimination 
was constitutional.  See Thornton, supra note 34.  For example, in 1972 the Sixth Circuit 
held that forcing a teacher to take a mandatory maternity leave beginning during her second 
trimester of pregnancy was unconstitutional sex discrimination.  LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).  But, just a year later, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the school board’s mandate that pregnant teachers begin maternity leave during the second 
trimester was not unconstitutional sex discrimination.  See Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 55. 417 U.S. at 494 (1974). 
 56. Id. at 496 n.20. 
 57. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-36. 
 58. Id. at 145-46 
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discrimination is not discrimination based on sex.  Justice Brennan 
identified the following as the objective of Title VII: “to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices 
and devices which have fostered [sexually] stratified job environments to 
the disadvantage of [women].”59
[i]t is not accurate to describe the program as dividing “potential 
recipients into two groups–pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”  
Insurance programs, company policies, and employment contracts all deal 
with future risks rather than historic facts.  The classification is between 
persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.”
  Justice Stevens noted that  
60  Justices 
Brennan and Stevens’s dissents were later given credence when Congress 
enacted the PDA.  In fact, many courts and legal thinkers consider the 
PDA a direct response to Gilbert.61
In Satty a woman who was required to take a leave of absence from her 
job during her pregnancy also lost all accumulated job seniority and did not 
receive pay while on leave.
 
62  The Court held that the employer’s seniority 
policy violated Title VII, but remanded as to the pay policy to determine 
whether the plaintiff had adequately preserved the right to proceed on a 
theory that the sick pay policy was a pretext for discrimination.63  In Satty, 
the Court relied heavily on their decision in Gilbert.64  In this case, Justices 
Powell and Stevens wrote concurrences and Justices Brennan and Marshall 
joined Justice Powell’s concurrence.65  At the close of his concurrence 
Justice Stevens expressed his distaste for Gilbert and for the majority’s 
reasoning.66  He wrote that because his preference for deciding the case on 
“a simpler rationale. . . . is foreclosed by Gilbert, I concur in the Court’s 
judgment on the understanding that as the law now stands, although some 
discrimination against pregnancy—as compared with other physical 
disabilities—is permissible, discrimination against pregnant or formerly 
pregnant employees is not.”67
 
 59. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)). 
  Justice Stevens would not have to wait long 
 60. Id. at 161 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 
(1983) (holding that an employer’s health plan limiting pregnancy coverage for employees’ 
spouses, but not for female employees, constituted discrimination against male employees); 
Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 819, 824 (2001). 
 62. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 137 (1977). 
 63. See id. at 145-46 
 64. See id. at 142-46. 
 65. See id. at 146. 
 66. See id. at 157 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. 
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for a change in the law. 
In 1978, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to 
include the PDA.  The PDA amends section 701, Definitions, by adding 
subsection (k), which provides: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this subchapter 
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.  This subsection shall not require 
an employer to pay for health benefits for abortion, except where the life 
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or 
except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: 
Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing 
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to 
abortion.68
The PDA only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees.
 
69
When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, Congress “unambiguously 
expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court 
in the Gilbert decision.”
 
70  The House Report stated that the dissenters in 
Gilbert had correctly interpreted Title VII,71 and the Senate Report quoted 
the dissenting opinions while noting that they correctly expressed “the 
principle and meaning of Title VII.”72  But the Congressional intent behind 
the PDA went beyond just reversing the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gilbert.73  In drafting the PDA, Congress intended to enforce the goal of 
prohibiting sex discrimination by re-defining sex discrimination to 
specifically include pregnancy discrimination.74
[I]n enacting the PDA, Congress embraced the dissent’s broader 
interpretation of Title VII which not only recognized that there are sex-
  A 2001 Washington 
federal district court decision explained: 
 
 68. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-k (1981). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 70. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983). 
 71. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749-
50; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., REPORT ON 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 148 (Comm. 
Print 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749-50 [hereinafter LEG. HIST.] ). 
 72. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 2-3 (1977); LEG. HIST., supra note 71, at 39-40). 
 73. See Magid, supra note 61, at 824-25. 
 74. See id. 
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based differences between men and women employees, but also required 
employers to provide women-only benefits or otherwise incur additional 
expenses on behalf of women in order to treat the sexes the same.75
This broad reading of the PDA, however, is not the norm.
 
76  In addition, 
the text of the PDA does not include childcare and though some argue that 
it could be construed to include breast-feeding, courts have unanimously 
held that it does not.77
In a 2001 article, Julie Manning Magid argued that courts have applied 
the PDA too narrowly.  Magid discussed the structure of the PDA—two 
clauses joined by “and”; each clause with its own grammatically 
independent meaning.
 
78
Importantly, both clauses define the PDA as referring to pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.  Joining these definitional 
provisions with the conjunction “or” specifically highlights that the 
amendment is concerned not only with aspects of pregnancy related to 
medical manifestations, but pregnancy in all of its manifestations.  In 
addition, only the more specific second clause involving disability 
compares the pregnant person to those similarly affected.
 
79
Magid noted that although many courts have focused exclusively on the 
second clause of the PDA,
 
80 the first clause shows “the gist of 
congressional intention in enacting the PDA and the second clause was 
merely illustrative and meant to overrule the holding in Gilbert by 
prescribing the specific remedy for the disabilities program in that case.”81  
The Supreme Court has supported Magid’s reading of the PDA and held 
that the first clause of the PDA is not limited by the language in the second 
clause.82
The FMLA, enacted fifteen years after the PDA, was the first federal 
statute to address parental leave.
  Thus, many courts’ narrow interpretations are questionable. 
83  Congress failed to pass more stringent 
family leave acts, but passed this watered down version, and it was hailed 
as a great success for women and families.84
 
 75. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
  The FMLA provides that 
 76. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 77. See infra notes 100-31, 175-218 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Magid, supra note 61, at 825. 
 79. Id. at 824. 
 80. See id. at 825-26. 
 81. Id. at 835. 
 82. See California Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987); 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983). 
 83. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2619, 2651-2654 (2006). 
 84. See Joanna Grossman, Why the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Should be 
Amended: The Act’s Tenth Anniversary Should Prompt a Rethinking, Oct. 7, 2003, 
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employers with more than fifty employees in a seventy-five mile radius 
must offer eligible employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave after 
childbirth or adoption, to care for an ill child, spouse or parent, or in the 
case of the employee’s own serious illness.85  Covered employers must 
continue the employee’s health coverage during the leave,86 and, upon the 
employee’s return to work, must reinstate the employee to the same or 
similar position.87  Employers may exempt their key employees from 
coverage—their highest-paid ten percent whose leave would cause the 
company harm88—and any employee who has not worked at least 1,250 
hours for that employer in the previous twelve months.89  The FMLA 
emphasizes the importance of both parents’ involvement in early 
childrearing and the importance of accommodations and thus attempts to 
keep parents from having to choose between job security and 
childrearing.90
But the FMLA has not achieved all of the goals outlined in its 
preamble.
 
91  For example, the FMLA does not mandate paid family leave, 
and because taking twelve weeks of unpaid leave may not be an 
economically feasible option, many parents are unable to stay home and 
“participate in early childrearing.”92  In addition, the FMLA did not change 
the status quo for many employees.  “[T]he FMLA was primarily a 
symbolic act, which afforded no significant assistance to working women, 
or men, and has perhaps retarded progress on the family leave front more 
than it has plausibly helped . . . . [T]he FMLA essentially replicated what 
the market was already providing—unpaid leave for large employers.”93  
Furthermore, the FMLA does not cover a vast percentage of American 
employees.94
 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20031007.html. 
 
 85. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
 86. Id. § 2614(c)(1). 
 87. Id. § 2614(a). 
 88. Id. § 2614(b). 
 89. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii). 
 90. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 324. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 325. 
 93. Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. 
L. REV. 395, 396 (1999).  Also, at the time the FMLA was enacted, thirty-four states, Puerto 
Rico, and Washington, D.C., had already passed leave legislation.  Id. at 407.  And, “the fact 
that the FMLA largely replicates what employers were already providing raises the question 
why the legislation was seen as so important and why its advocates were willing to settle for 
such a weak form of parental leave.”  Id. at 410. 
 94. See id. at 406; see also Kaminer, supra note 15, at 307 n.10 (noting that only 
approximately one-half of the American workforce is eligible for leave under the FMLA). 
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Ten years after the FMLA was passed, though most employers have 
implemented it, it has had little effect on the stereotypes and biases that 
women face in the workplace.95  Because women are still more likely than 
men to take childcare leave, employers continue to see women as more 
costly and less desirable.96  The legislative history of the FMLA indicates it 
was passed to complement existing laws (such as Title VII and the PDA) 
and to accommodate mothers.97  And while it has forced some employers 
to accommodate female employees, the FMLA has not changed the 
stereotypes those employees face when they become pregnant or take leave 
to stay home with a sick child.98  In fact, some scholars argue that the 
FMLA is filled with underlying stereotypes.99
Because this Comment focuses on discrimination, particularly the subtle 
forms of discrimination—embedded assumptions, stereotypes, and 
biases—faced by working pregnant women and mothers, the cases 
discussed center on Title VII, sex-plus cases, and the PDA.  There will be a 
more extensive discussion of the FMLA in Part II. 
 
C. The Cases 
1.  Breast-Feeding 
Discrimination because of breast-feeding affects the least number of 
women of the three bases for discrimination discussed in this Comment, 
but it is an important issue to new mothers who want to return to work and 
provide the health and psychological benefits of breast-feeding to their 
children.100  Lactation is rarely discussed in Puritanical American 
society.101
 
 95. See Magid, supra note 61, at 834; Selmi, supra note 93, at 410.  But, by other 
standards the FMLA has been a success.  See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, FMLA 
Regulations Threatened, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/Default.aspx?tabid=140 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2006).  The FMLA has “transformed the workplace and strengthened the 
American family by helping millions of Americans balance work and family 
responsibilities.”  Id. 
  California and Illinois are among the handful of states that 
 96. See Grossman, supra note 84. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See, e.g., Lindsay R.B. Dickerson, “Your Wife Should Handle It”: The Implicit 
Messages of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 441 (2005) 
(reviewing SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE 
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN (2004)). 
 100. See Christine G. Cooper, The Search for Sex Equality: A Perspective From The 
Podium on Law and Cultural Change, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 450 (2005). 
 101. See id. 
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provide some protection to lactating working women.102  Some private 
companies accommodate breast-feeding women on their own; about 
twenty-one percent of companies surveyed in a 2004 study said they 
provided lactation programs or rooms where lactating mothers could pump 
breast milk.103  But no federal statute provides explicit protection to these 
women.104
In a 2001 article, Shana M. Christrup described the inadequate 
protection given to breast-feeding women in the workplace by the current 
statutes (the PDA, Title VII, the ADA, and the FMLA) and suggested a 
policy requiring employers to accommodate breast-pumping.
 
105  To 
promote equality in the workplace, such that men and women are paid the 
same for doing the same job, policies must “allow women to enter the 
separate sphere of continuous employment while men enter the separate 
sphere of child rearing.”106  Breast-pumping policies can be a tool used to 
promote equality between the sexes at home and at work, if they encourage 
both women and men to participate in the public and private sphere.107  
Christrup noted that a breast-pumping accommodation policy would be 
relatively simple to implement and, as long as it is accompanied by the 
FMLA, would give women more options—women would be more free to 
decide when to return to work and whether or not to breast-feed.108  In 
addition to the lack of policies tailored to address the concerns of breast-
feeding women, courts uniformly have held that Title VII does not cover 
breast-feeding.109
For example, in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., the court denied relief to a 
plaintiff who sought additional time off from work under Title VII in order 
 
 
 102. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1030 (West 2001) (requiring employers to provide a 
reasonable amount of break time to accommodate an employee’s desire to pump breast 
milk); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 260/10 (2001) (requiring employers to provide reasonable 
unpaid break time each day for employees to pump breast milk). 
 103. See Shera Dalin, Babes in Workland, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2005, at 
E01. 
 104. See Cooper, supra note 100, at 450-52. 
 105. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 494. 
 106. Id. at 497. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. at 484; see, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 
2004) (surveying federal breast-feeding discrimination cases); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 
927 (4th Cir. 1988); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990); cf. 
McNill v. New York City Dept. of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a 
mother who was medically required to breast-feed her child in order for the child to survive 
was not protected by the PDA because the PDA protected the medical conditions of the 
mother, not the child). 
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to accommodate her breast-feeding.110  The plaintiff’s six-week old infant 
would not eat unless fed from the plaintiff’s breast.111  The court 
characterized plaintiff’s request as “unrelated to any disability or medical 
condition associated with pregnancy or childbirth.”112  The court 
continued, “[r]ather, her request was for personal leave, based on her 
inability to wean her child from breast-feeding.”113  The court noted that 
the PDA changed the law after Gilbert, but did not interpret the statute to 
include breast-feeding under “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions.”114  The court stated that if the legislature had intended to cover 
a breast-feeding female employee’s childcare concerns, the legislature 
should have specifically included that in Title VII or the PDA.115
Courts have also declined to protect breast-feeding as a sex-plus 
characteristic.  In Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., the plaintiff brought action 
against her employer under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (the “ADA”), alleging that her employer insufficiently accommodated 
her desire to pump breast milk at work.
 
116  The court followed precedent on 
the plaintiff’s ADA claim and held that pregnancy and related medical 
conditions do not, lacking extraordinary conditions, constitute a disability 
for the purposes of the ADA.117  The court noted, however, that “[t]his . . . 
is not to say that a statute requiring employers to afford reasonable 
accommodation to women engaged in breast feeding or breast pumping 
would be undesirable” but that the determination is for the legislature, not 
the courts.118  The court then turned to plaintiff’s Title VII claim.  The 
court defined gender discrimination as “favoring men while disadvantaging 
women or vice versa,” and wrote that “[t]he drawing of distinctions among 
persons of one gender on the basis of criteria that are immaterial to the 
other, while in given cases perhaps deplorable, is not the sort of behavior 
covered by Title VII.”119
The court also denied the plaintiff’s Title VII sex-plus claim, finding that 
the plaintiff was not similarly situated to male employees as required for a 
prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination.
 
120
 
 110. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 867-70. 
  “To allow a claim based on 
 111. See id. at 868. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 869. 
 115. See id. at 870. 
 116. See Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. at 309. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 310.  For support of this proposition, the court cited Coleman v. B-G 
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sex-plus discrimination here would elevate breast milk pumping—alone—
to a protected status.”121  Again, the court suggested that if breast milk 
pumping is to be considered a protected class, then Congress should 
designate it as such.122
In Barrash v. Bowen, a female employee of the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) claimed that she had been discriminated against 
within the meaning of the PDA when she was denied a six-month leave to 
breast-feed her newborn and subsequently terminated for failure to return 
to work.
 
123  The district court performed a disparate impact analysis and 
found that the new leave policy could not lawfully be applied to young 
mothers wishing to breast-feed their newborns because as to them the 
policy had a disparate impact.124  But the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision for the plaintiff.125
The Fourth Circuit did not think a disparate impact analysis was 
appropriate because such an analysis is appropriate only in cases of non-
discretionary acts; the grant of leave without pay is discretionary; and, 
according to the collective bargaining agreement to which the plaintiff was 
subject, employees cannot demand leave without pay.
 
126  The district court 
had reasoned that the directive given to SSA managers to reduce the 
amount of leave without pay given to employees substantially limited the 
managers’ discretionary authority.127  The Fourth Circuit interpreted the 
limiting directive differently, reasoning that because the authorization of 
leave was still technically discretionary, disparate impact analysis was not 
appropriate.128  In dicta, the Fourth Circuit found that even if the district 
court’s premises were accepted, the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim 
would still fail because the evidence comparing leaves given to 
incapacitated men to leaves given to breast-feeding women was not 
valid.129  “Under the [PDA] pregnancy and related conditions must be 
treated as illnesses only when incapacitating.”130
 
Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997). 
  The court wrote that 
 121. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 122. See id. 
 123. 846 F.2d 927, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1988).  The plaintiff was granted six months of 
unpaid leave to breast-feed her first child.  Before the birth of her second child, however, the 
SSA was ordered to tighten its grants of leave without pay to cut costs and increase 
efficiency.  See id. at 928. 
 124. See id. at 929. 
 125. See id. at 932. 
 126. See id. at 931. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 931-32. 
 130. Id. at 931. 
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“[o]ne can draw no valid comparison between people, male and female, 
suffering extended incapacity from illness or injury and young mothers 
wishing to nurse little babies.”131
2. Pregnancy 
  According to the Fourth Circuit, even if 
granting leave without pay had not been discretionary, the plaintiff’s claim 
would have failed for lack of an appropriate comparison group. 
Unlike discrimination against women due to breast-feeding, pregnancy 
discrimination is covered by a specific piece of legislation: Title VII as 
amended by the PDA.  The PDA’s language itself limits its application, and 
many courts, most notably the Seventh Circuit, have limited the statute’s 
protections even further.  The protections afforded to pregnant women are 
insufficient. 
In Maldonado v. U.S. Bank the Seventh Circuit purported to “restate [its] 
position on pregnancy discrimination.”132  The plaintiff applied for a teller 
position at a bank.133  She received a part-time position, but was fired 
during training after notifying her supervisor that she was pregnant.134  The 
plaintiff’s supervisor stated that she had estimated that the plaintiff would 
have her child in July, and the bank needed an employee who could work 
through the summer.135  The Seventh Circuit found for the plaintiff but on 
very narrow grounds, limiting its holding to the specific facts of the case: 
“an employer cannot discriminate against a pregnant employee simply 
because it believes pregnancy might prevent the employee from doing her 
job.”136  In fact, the court appeared to conclude that only women who 
experience none of the normal side-effects of pregnancy and need no time 
off to give birth or to recover from childbirth are covered by the PDA.137
Maldonado relied heavily on a 1996 Seventh Circuit case, Troupe v. 
May Department Stores Co., in which Judge Posner noted in dicta that an 
employer can dismiss an employee due to excessive absences, even if the 
absences were a result of the employee’s pregnancy.
 
138
 
 131. Id. at 931-32. 
  “The [PDA] does 
not, despite the urgings of feminist scholars, require employers to offer 
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to 
work—to make it as easy, say, as it is for their spouses to continue working 
 132. 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 133. See id. at 764. 
 134. See id. at 764-65. 
 135. See id. at 765. 
 136. Id. at 761. 
 137. See id. at 766-68; see also Magid, supra note 61, at 826. 
 138. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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during pregnancy.”139
In a 2001 article Julie Manning Magid wrote that by the Seventh 
Circuit’s definition of pregnancy discrimination, “it is impermissible to 
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy alone but if pregnancy actually 
manifests itself in any of the biological ways that it must manifest itself, an 
employer can take adverse actions based on these ‘secondary effects.’”
  Maldonado continued to refine and reassert the 
Seventh Circuit’s limited view of the PDA established in Troupe. 
140  
Magid used Maldonado as the centerpiece of her argument for a broader 
reading of the PDA.  She noted that the Maldonado court’s holding is 
understandable given its misstatement of the purpose of the PDA.141  
Further, Magid saw common stereotypes found in decisions about 
pregnancy discrimination embedded in the court’s misstatement.  For 
example, the court held that pregnancy is a disability, and worse, a 
disability that women choose to inflict upon themselves, thus women, not 
their innocent employers should bear the burden of the choice.142  Magid 
finally argued that the court’s holding in Maldonado encourages a woman 
to hide a pregnancy from an employer for fear that one small 
inconvenience to an employer could cost the woman her job.  The result 
would be that employers would not be able to plan for pregnant workers’ 
absences.143  “Covering,” attempting to make an undesirable characteristic 
such as pregnancy less obtrusive, is evident in the next case and will be 
discussed more fully in Part II.144
Clay v. Holy Cross Hospital shows one example of how covering can 
hurt a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff in the long run.  In Clay, a doctor 
sued her former employer, alleging that she was terminated, in violation of 
the PDA, because of her pregnancy.
 
145
 
 139. See id. at 738 (citations omitted). 
  The employer contended that the 
plaintiff was fired because she was less likely to grow her practice than the 
retained physicians and was unwilling to participate in hospital marketing 
 140. Magid, supra note 61, at 829. 
 141. See id. at 830.  The court stated that “the PDA was designed to allow individual 
women to make independent choices about whether to continue to work while pregnant . . . 
.”  Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 767.  This statement is not a true reflection of the congressional 
record stating the purpose of amending Title VII to explicitly include pregnancy as gender 
discrimination.  Rather, one of the sponsors of the PDA, Senator Williams, explained that 
the “entire thrust” of the PDA “is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and 
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in 
family life.”  Magid, supra note 61, at 830 (citations omitted). 
 142. See Magid, supra note 61, at 830-31. 
 143. See id. at 831. 
 144. See Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 32. 
 145. See Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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efforts.146  Initially the plaintiff concealed her pregnancy from her 
employer, but she contended that her employer knew of her pregnancy 
before her firing.147  The court held that the plaintiff could not establish the 
first prong of the prima facie case if her employer did not know about her 
pregnancy.148  Alternately the court held that the plaintiff’s pretext 
argument was unavailing.149  Judge Wood concurred in the judgment, but 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the record did not support the 
plaintiff’s allegation that her employer knew about her pregnancy before 
selecting her for the reduction-in-force.150
Other circuits have adopted the Seventh Circuit’s pregnancy 
discrimination jurisprudence as well.  In In re Carnegie Center Associates, 
a pregnant unmarried secretary’s position was eliminated as part of a 
reduction-in-force during her maternity leave.
 
151  Before she left on 
maternity leave, the plaintiff’s superiors made comments to her 
encouraging her to marry.152  The Third Circuit asked “whether terminating 
an employee because she is absent on maternity leave is a violation of the 
PDA” in its consideration of the plaintiff’s appeal.153
In deciding this question the court looked to Troupe and Smith v. F.W. 
Morse & Co., Inc.
 
 154 for guidance.  In Smith, the First Circuit held that the 
elimination of the plaintiff’s position while she was on maternity leave was 
not an act of pregnancy discrimination.155  The court reasoned that the 
employer discovered that the position was superfluous while the employee 
was on maternity leave and that the PDA “does not command that an 
employer bury its head in the sand and struthiously refrain from 
implementing business judgments simply because they affect a parturient 
employee.”156  Thus, the necessary nexus between the plaintiff’s 
termination and her pregnancy was missing.157
 
 146. See id. at 1004. 
  The Third Circuit 
differentiated Smith on the grounds that it did not involve an employer’s 
decision as to which of several positions to eliminate, and ultimately found 
 147. See id. at 1006-07. 
 148. See id. at 1007 n.7. 
 149. See id. at 1007-09. 
 150. See id. at 1009-10 (Wood, J., concurring). 
 151. 129 F.3d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 152. See id. at 293. 
 153. Id. at 295. 
 154. 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996) 
 155. See id. at 425. 
 156. Id. at 424. 
 157. See id. at 425. 
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that Smith was not controlling.158
The court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Troupe and held 
that an employer’s mere consideration of an employee’s maternity leave is 
not a violation of the PDA.
 
159  “The PDA does not require an employer to 
grant maternity leave or to reinstate an employee after a maternity leave.  
The PDA merely requires that an employer treat a pregnant woman in the 
same fashion as any other temporarily disabled employee.”160  Thus, the 
court denied the plaintiff’s claim of pregnancy discrimination.161
A lengthy dissent followed the majority’s opinion. The dissent took 
issue with the majority’s equation of pregnancy-related disability with 
temporary disabilities under the ADA.
 
162
If Congress intended to equate pregnancy with a temporary disability 
under the ADA, it afforded pregnant women precious little protection 
when it enacted the PDA.  Pregnancy is by its nature temporary.  Holding 
that it is therefore equivalent of a “temporary disability” is hardly 
consistent with “the social policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII 
and filtered through the phrase ‘to discriminate’ contained in [that Act].”  
Accordingly, we can only give effect to the intent behind this statute by 
viewing the term “temporarily disabled” as it applies to pregnancy as 
referring to the duration of the disability, not to the quality of it.
 
163
The dissent also argued that the majority should have been guided by 
Smith, rather than following what it considered the flawed reasoning of 
Troupe.
 
164  The dissent argued that both Troupe and the majority limit the 
protection that Congress intended to provide when it enacted the PDA.165  
The dissent reasoned that if the plaintiff in Troupe was terminated because 
of tardiness caused by morning sickness (a condition of her pregnancy), 
then she was terminated because of her pregnancy.166
 
 158. See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1997). 
  Instead, the dissent 
argued, the majority should have found that the plaintiff’s employer clearly 
did not put her maternity leave to one side when deciding to eliminate her 
position and thus held that the decision to eliminate her job was based on 
 159. See id. at 297. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 299. 
 162. See id. at 302-04 (McKee, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 304 (citations omitted). 
 164. See id. at 304-08. 
 165. See id. at 307.  “[I]n using the broad phrase ‘women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth and related medical conditions,’ the [PDA] makes clear that its protection extends 
to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process.”  H.R. REP. 95-948 
(1978), at 5 (quoted in Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 307 (McKee, J., dissenting)). 
 166. See Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 307 (McKee, J., dissenting). 
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her maternity leave.167  “That causal nexus runs afoul of Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination.”168  The broader interpretation of Title 
VII and the PDA argued for in In re Carnegie Center Associates’s dissent 
has been embraced in some courts.  And in California Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court offered a less proscribed view of 
the PDA, holding that the PDA is a floor below which pregnancy disability 
benefits may not fall, rather than a ceiling above which they may not 
rise.169
A recent case that read the PDA broadly is Erickson v. Bartell Drug 
Co.
  Thus, the PDA does not prevent employment practices that favor 
pregnancy. 
170  Erickson raised the question of whether or not the selective 
exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employer’s generally 
comprehensive prescription plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII and particularly the PDA.171  The District Court for the 
Western District of Washington held that “[i]n light of the fact that 
prescription contraceptives are used only by women, [the employer’s] 
choice to exclude that particular benefit from its generally applicable 
benefit plan is discriminatory.”172
Read in the context of Title VII as a whole, the PDA is a broad 
acknowledgement of the intent of Congress to outlaw any and all 
discrimination against any and all women in the terms and conditions of 
their employment, including the benefits an employer provides to its 
employees.  Male and female employees have different, sex-based 
disability and healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact 
that only women can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription 
contraception.  The special or increased healthcare needs associated with a 
woman’s unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, 
and on the same terms as other healthcare needs.
  In so holding, the court read the PDA 
broadly. 
173
The Erickson court found that prescription contraceptives were covered 
under the PDA because they fell within the phrase “pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions.”
 
174
 
 167. See id. at 308. 
  But the court also noted in dicta that the 
decision to exclude prescription contraceptives from the prescription plan 
 168. Id. 
 169. See 479 U.S. 272, 285-92 (1987). 
 170. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 171. See id. at 1268. 
 172. Id. at 1272. 
 173. Id. at 1271. 
 174. See id. at 1274. 
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would be sex discrimination under Title VII, even if it did not fall under the 
PDA.175
3. Childcare Responsibilities 
  
Discrimination on the basis of childcare responsibilities affects many 
working parents.  Some scholars have recognized that the statutes that 
address the work-family conflict (Title VII and the FMLA) are 
insufficient.176  Debbie N. Kaminer argued that Title VII is limited by its 
focus on formal equality, and courts interpreting Title VII have been 
generally unwilling to require differential treatment for men and women.177  
Kaminer also argued that the FMLA is insufficient because it provides only 
unpaid leave and does not help parents with their day-to-day childcare 
obligations.178
In Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., a female television producer sued her 
employer, claiming, among other things, sex-plus discrimination under 
Title VII.
  The insufficiency of the current statutory scheme is evident 
in the following cases. 
179  When the plaintiff returned to work from maternity leave, she 
requested and was given a different schedule to better accommodate her 
childcare needs.180  More than two years after returning from maternity 
leave, the defendant changed the plaintiff’s schedule, despite the plaintiff’s 
protestations that the new schedule would not be feasible because of her 
childcare responsibilities.181  The plaintiff’s employer again asked her if 
she would work the altered schedule, and the plaintiff repeated that she 
could not because she did not have childcare.182  As a result, the plaintiff’s 
employer gave her a memo that asked her to resign because she would not 
work the adjusted schedule.183
 
 175. See id. 
  The plaintiff refused to sign the memo and 
 176. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 15, at 307. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id.  Kaminer suggested new legislation that would be based on section 701(j) of 
Title VII, which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace.  See id. at 308.  
Kaminer favors this balancing approach because it is based on accommodation rather than 
formal equality; it recognizes the needs of employer and employee and forces the 
accommodation of a parent only when an employer would not suffer undue hardship.  See 
id. at 308-09. Greater discussion of Kaminer’s remedy and other remedies can be found in 
Part II.  See infra notes 336-41 and accompanying text. 
 179. See 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 210-11 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 180. See id. at 211. 
 181. See id.  The plaintiff was requested to work the 4:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. shift, but 
because her husband, a police officer, worked the night shift, the schedule change would 
mean that the plaintiff’s child would be left unattended from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.  See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
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was fired.184
The plaintiff alleged sex-plus discrimination, citing the fact that she had 
a child as the plus factor.
 
185  The court did not agree with her 
characterization and thought the correct characterization was sex plus 
“childcare difficulties.”186  The court required that the “second 
characteristic also be protected by antidiscrimination statutes.”187  The 
court noted that “the courts which have considered the issue have held that 
child care is a gender-neutral trait,”188 and held that “child-rearing is not a 
sex-plus characteristic protected by Title VII, the [PDA], or any other 
federal or state antidiscrimination statute.”189  Further, the court held that 
the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action.190
Interestingly the Guglietta court did not cite Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., a 1971 pre-PDA case of gender discrimination in which the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s grant of summary 
judgment for an employer.
 
191  In Phillips, the plaintiff’s claim of gender 
discrimination was based on the employer’s refusal to accept applications 
from women with pre-school age children, but not from men with children 
of the same age.192  The Court suggested that it was perhaps possible to 
establish a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
usual operation of the employer’s business by showing that some women 
with pre-school age children have childcare responsibilities that hamper job 
performance and that men do not normally have those responsibilities.193  
This portion of the Court’s opinion included many embedded assumptions 
about women’s role as childcare giver, assumptions that Justice Marshall 
identified in his concurrence.194
 
 184. See id. 
  “I fear that . . . the Court has fallen into 
the trap of assuming that [Title VII] permits ancient canards about the 
 185. See id. at 213. 
 186. See id. at 213-14. 
 187. Id. at 213.  But see Witt v. County Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04C3938, 2004 WL 
2644397, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (discrimination based on sex plus marriage or sex 
plus familial status is actionable). 
 188. Guglietta, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 215. 
 191. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).  “The Court thus 
created a cause of action for ‘gender-plus’ discrimination; that is, Title VII not only forbids 
discrimination against women in general, but also discrimination against subclasses of 
women, such as women with pre-school-age children.”  Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of 
Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997) (gender plus marital status case). 
 192. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543. 
 193. See id. at 544. 
 194. See id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination.  Congress, however, 
sought just the opposite result.”195  Marshall continued, “[e]ven 
characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve 
as predicates for restricting employment opportunity.  The exception for a 
‘bona fide occupational qualification’ was not intended to swallow the 
rule.”196
In Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., the plaintiff alleged discrimination 
based on her status as a new mother under the PDA.
  The biases seen in Phillips have not disappeared in more recent 
cases. 
197  The plaintiff was 
demoted while on maternity leave, allegedly because of her failure to send 
eighty-three acknowledgement letters to donors.198  The plaintiff’s new 
position had fewer responsibilities and a salary about half that of her old 
position.199  The plaintiff claimed that when she spoke with her employer 
about the new position, the executive director told her that she was being 
given a position “for a new mom to handle.”200  The plaintiff did not accept 
the new position, and the person who took the position received as much as 
the plaintiff had received in the position she held before her maternity 
leave.201  The plaintiff brought a Title VII action against her employer 
alleging pregnancy discrimination.202  The Eighth Circuit asked “whether 
being discriminated against because of one’s status as a new parent is 
‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions,’ and therefore violative of the PDA” and concluded that a 
woman’s decision to care for a child is not a medical condition related to 
childbirth or pregnancy, instead it is “a social role chosen by all new 
parents who make the decision to raise a child.”203  Thus, the plaintiff’s 
claim of pregnancy discrimination based on her status as a new parent 
failed.204
The Piantanida court emphasized that deciding to take care of a child is 
a choice, and a choice that can be made by any person, man or woman.
 
205
 
 195. Id. at 545. 
  
“An employer’s discrimination against an employee who has accepted this 
parental role—reprehensible as this discrimination might be—is therefore 
 196. Id. 
 197. See 116 F.3d 340, 341-43 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 198. See id. at 341. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. at 342 (citations omitted). 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
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not based on the gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and 
child-bearing, but rather is based on a gender-neutral status potentially 
possessible by all employees . . . .”206
The Colorado District Court in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. held that 
breast-feeding and child rearing are not conditions within the scope of the 
PDA and, therefore, refusing to provide an employee with a part-time 
schedule to accommodate her breast-feeding or childcare responsibilities is 
not conduct protected by Title VII.
  Though stereotypes may be 
embedded in the court’s decision in this case, the court’s decision, like 
other PDA childcare cases, shows the limits of the PDA. 
207  The court also discussed whether or 
not a plaintiff need be pregnant at the time the alleged discrimination took 
place in order to file a claim under the PDA.208  The court determined that 
a plaintiff must “show she was pregnant at or near the time of the alleged 
discrimination.”209  In this case, where the plaintiff’s termination occurred 
less than three months after she gave birth and only three weeks after the 
end of her medical leave, the court determined that the plaintiff was a 
member of the protected class.210  Though the plaintiff here lost her Title 
VII claim, summary judgment was denied to her employer on her FMLA 
claim.211
II.  NARROW READINGS & INSUFFICIENT STATUTES EQUAL 
INSUFFICIENT COVERAGE 
 
Many courts have read the statutes narrowly and limited protections.  
But the statutes themselves also provide limited protections—for example, 
it is difficult, even on a broad reading, to find that the PDA covers 
childcare concerns.  There are issues that the PDA simply did not grapple 
with, and those things need to be grappled with if women are going to have 
the opportunity to participate actually in a fair and equal workforce.  Legal 
theorists have argued for a broader interpretation and, in some cases, new 
statutes that would offer more protections.  First I will discuss the current 
status of the law affecting discrimination against pregnant women and 
mothers.  Then I will discuss the many reasons why the status quo is 
harmful to women and various proposals for change. 
 
 206. Id.  See also Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 
905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (child rearing is gender neutral). 
 207. 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 208. See id. at 1492-93. 
 209. Id. at 1493. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at 1497. 
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A. Narrow Readings 
The way the statutes have been applied to pregnancy, motherhood, and 
childcare responsibilities has not been consistent across the circuits, and 
many courts have narrowed the statutes’ scope of protections.212  “[A] 
prevailing view is that sex discrimination concerning pregnancy occurs, if 
at all, within the nine months of the female employee’s biological 
pregnancy.”213  The Seventh Circuit, for example, has taken a very narrow 
view of the PDA—a view that is likely narrower than that which was 
intended by the drafters of the PDA.214  According to the Seventh Circuit, 
in cases like Maldonado, only women who experience none of the expected 
side effects of pregnancy and need no time off from work to give birth or to 
recover from childbirth are covered by the PDA.215  Other circuits have 
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s narrow view of the PDA as well.216
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co. is one of the cases that 
contributed to the Seventh Circuit’s narrowing trend.  In that case the 
  Though 
all circuits have not read the statute so narrowly, the Seventh Circuit’s 
pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence has created a trend towards 
limiting the PDA’s scope. 
 
 212. Title VII protects against discrimination “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex,” 
but, because several courts have held that childcare is gender neutral, discrimination against 
a woman because of her childcare responsibilities cannot be on its own “because of sex” or 
“on the basis of sex.”  See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 
1997); Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004).  These 
holdings have limited the protections available to women who seek judicial action because 
of discrimination based on their childcare responsibilities.  A Title VII sex-plus claim may 
still be possible, but as seen in Part I, such claims have been largely unsuccessful.  See, e.g., 
Guglietta, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 213-14 (plaintiff’s sex-plus claim was not viable because court 
required that the second characteristic also be covered by antidiscrimination statutes and 
childcare is gender-neutral).  But see Witt v. County Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04C3938, 2004 
WL 2644397, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (discrimination based on sex plus marriage or 
sex plus familial status is actionable). 
 213. Magid, supra note 61, at 850.  Magid also notes that limiting the PDA’s protection 
to the nine months of a woman’s pregnancy is inconsistent with the PDA, which explicitly 
protects women from pregnancy discrimination “before, during and after her pregnancy.”  
See id. at 850-51.  “There is, in sum, a point at which pregnancy and immediate post-partum 
requirements—clearly gender-based in nature—end and gender-neutral child care activities 
begin.”  Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Md. 1994) (granting 
summary judgment  to employer on plaintiff’s claim that she was discriminated against in 
the meaning of Title VII because of the parental leave she took following maternity leave). 
 214. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 
186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 215. See Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 766-68. 
 216. See, e.g., Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Seventh 
Circuit’s narrow view of pregnancy discrimination); In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 
290 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Seventh Circuit specifically said that employers do not have an affirmative 
duty to offer maternity leave or make it easier for pregnant women to work 
under the PDA.217  Judge Posner wrote that “[e]mployers can treat pregnant 
women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant 
employees, even to the point of ‘conditioning the availability of an 
employment benefit on an employee’s decision to return to work after the 
end of the medical disability that pregnancy causes.’”218  Posner also wrote 
that under the PDA an employer must ignore the employee’s pregnancy but 
not her absence from work.219  Though on its face this proposition may 
seem reasonable, it leads to the conclusion that pregnant women cannot be 
discriminated against on the basis of their pregnancy but they can be 
discriminated against on the basis of the side effects of that pregnancy.220
All circuits have not read the statute so narrowly, however, despite the 
trend toward limiting the PDA’s scope that the Seventh Circuit’s pregnancy 
discrimination jurisprudence has created.  In Erickson, the plaintiff asserted 
that her employer’s exclusion of prescription contraceptives from the 
company prescription plan was sex discrimination within the purviews of 
Title VII and the PDA.
 
221  The district court in Erickson looked beyond the 
letter of the statute and analyzed the congressional intent of the PDA and 
relevant Supreme Court decisions.222  The court wrote that, “the PDA is not 
a begrudging recognition of a limited grant of rights to a strictly defined 
group of women who happen to be pregnant.”223  Erickson read the PDA 
broadly in two important ways.  First, the court did not restrict the PDA’s 
application to women who are physically pregnant at the time the alleged 
discrimination occurs.224  Second, the court read the PDA to require 
employers to take affirmative action on the part of women if that is 
necessary to treat the sexes the same.225
 
 217. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. 
  While some courts have declined 
to extend the PDA to women who gave birth just weeks or months ago, the 
Erickson court found that prescription contraceptives were covered by the 
 218. Id. (citing Maganuco v. Leyuden Cty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 445 (7th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See, e.g., Maldonado, 186 F.3d at 766-68; see also Magid, supra note 61, at 826.  
Though the case alleged intentional discrimination, Posner noted in dicta that disparate 
impact is a viable theory for pregnancy discrimination, but it is properly understood as “a 
means of dealing with the residues of past discrimination, rather than a warrant for 
favoritism.”  See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. 
 221. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 222. See id. at 1268-71. 
 223. Id. at 1271. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. at 1270. 
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PDA because they were included in the phrase “pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related conditions,” showing that a broader interpretation than those 
readings conventionally given of the PDA is possible.226
Evidentiary standards also play a substantial role in determining how 
narrowly or broadly the statutes are read.  Different circuits use different 
evidentiary standards, and the use of heightened evidentiary standards has 
sometimes narrowed the scope of protections.
 
227  Evidence in pregnancy 
discrimination cases is rarely considered to be direct evidence and, thus, the 
McDonnell Douglas test is most often used.228  But the fourth prong of 
McDonnell Douglas, that similarly situated employees who are not 
members of the protected class received superior treatment, presents 
problems for pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs, and a different burden is 
placed on the plaintiff depending on the circuit.229  Julie Manning Magid 
criticized the courts for continuing to require a comparison group for 
pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs when so often a similarly situated group 
simply does not exist.230  For example, in Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., the court 
denied the plaintiff’s Title VII sex-plus claim of sex plus breast-milk 
pumping because the plaintiff could not state a prima facie case—she could 
not identify similarly situated male employees.231
 
 226. See id. at 1274. 
  Logically a group of 
 227. See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.6 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (fourth element of McDonnell Douglas test can be satisfied in several ways); 
Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff did not establish 
the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas test because she did not show that she was treated 
less favorably than similarly situated non-pregnant employees because she was pregnant). 
 228. See Magid, supra note 61, at 839. 
Courts define the requirement for direct evidence as that which, if believed by the 
trier of fact, proves discrimination without relying upon inference of presumption.  
However, requiring a question to be answered without drawing any inferences 
from what was said or done ignores the reality that, ‘all knowledge is inferential.’ 
Id. at 845 (citations omitted). 
 229. Compare Coney v. Dallas Hous. Auth., No. 3-01-CV-2337-L, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1803, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2003) (plaintiff did not establish fourth prong of 
McDonnell Douglas test because she did not identify employees similarly situated to her 
who were more favorably treated), with Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1195 
n.6 (fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas test does not require “a plaintiff to compare herself 
to similarly-situated co-workers”). 
 230. See Magid, supra note 61, at 838-39.  And “[t]hose circuits that have held plaintiffs 
to a higher standard under the McDonnell Douglas analysis in the past, have signaled they 
will continue to do so despite the Reeves decision.”  Id. at 842.  In Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products the Supreme Court concluded that if a plaintiff established a prima facie 
case of discrimination and had sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that the 
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action was pretext, then 
the fact finder could conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.  See 530 U.S. 
133, 146-47 (2000). 
 231. See 49 F. Supp. 2d. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 
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lactating male employees in need of a breast-feeding accommodation did 
not exist, but this did not stop the court from requiring it.  Similarly, in 
Barrash v. Bowen, a disparate impact case, the court found that “[o]ne can 
draw no valid comparison between people, male and female, suffering 
extended incapacity from illness or injury and young mothers wishing to 
nurse little babies.”232  The court required a showing that women were 
treated less favorably than men in order to invalidate the rule.233
Although FMLA decisions have not been discussed extensively in this 
Comment, many courts have read the FMLA narrowly as well.
  The 
obvious condescension of the court towards the woman in Barrash showed 
a lack of respect for pregnancy discrimination claims.  These types of 
impossible-to-meet evidentiary burdens are common. 
234  For 
example, a mother was not entitled to use the FMLA leave to move her 
teenage son in with relatives because she was not moving him so he could 
receive medical or psychological treatment, but instead to protect him from 
repeated beatings by his peers.235
B. Insufficient Statutes 
  Like the PDA, the FMLA has often been 
interpreted narrowly, but the narrowness of the statute itself is of most 
interest in this Comment.  The ways in which the statutes are constrained 
by limitations built into their texts are discussed in the next section. 
Narrow interpretations alone do not account for the gaps in protection 
from discrimination for pregnant women and mothers—the statutes 
themselves are insufficient to protect pregnant women and mothers from 
discrimination on that basis.  The way the drafters of Title VII conceived of 
discrimination is important to understand the limits of the statute.  “The 
simplicity of the original statutory scheme indicated a Congressional 
assessment of discrimination in 1964 as an important issue and an 
unacceptable practice, but also as a simple and obvious occurrence that 
 
927 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 232. 846 F.2d at 931-32. 
 233. See id. at 932. 
 234. See, e.g., O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (woman was discharged while on FMLA leave as part of a reduction in force).  
But see Naomi S. Stern, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and 
American Women: A Call for a  Revived Feminist-Socialist Theory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 329 
n.49 (2004) (“relatively generous interpretations of the FMLA do . . . exist in federal court 
decisions”). 
 235. See Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiff had no specific plans to seek treatment for her son once she reached the 
Philippines). 
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could be easily remedied.”236  Since 1964, the statute has been amended 
several times to account for less obvious forms of discrimination.237  The 
drafters of the PDA, like the original Title VII, assumed that protecting 
against pregnancy discrimination would be simple and easy to 
implement.238  But it has been anything but simple to rectify discrimination 
against women who “are at a biological disadvantage in a culturally created 
employment situation.”239  Title VII as amended by the PDA mandates that 
men and women (even pregnant women) be treated equally,240 but does not 
acknowledge that pregnancy is a gender difference that, while not grounds 
for discrimination, must be recognized.241
The PDA’s application after a woman has a child is limited by the very 
text of the statute.  In order to be covered by the PDA the woman must 
have been discriminated “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
  This major limitation comes 
from the statute as drafted, not the statute as applied. 
242  While some courts have read 
the message of the PDA rather than the letter and held that it covers such 
things as prescription contraceptives, 243 the majority of courts require that 
a woman be discriminated against in a way that is temporally and 
thematically related to her pregnancy in order to be covered.244
 
 236. Kathryn Branch, Note, Are Women Worth as Much as Men?: Employment 
Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 146 
(1994). 
  For 
 237. See id. at 146-47. 
 238. See id. at 148. 
 239. Id. at 149. 
 240. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).  One court said the PDA was designed “to address 
the stereotype that ‘women are less desirable employees because they are liable to become 
pregnant,’ and to insure that the decision whether to work while pregnant ‘was reserved for 
each individual woman to make for herself.’”  Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 
(7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).  That court continued on, however, somewhat 
anachronistically, to write that “under the PDA, employers are not required to give pregnant 
women special treatment; they must only treat them the same as all other employees.”  Id. 
 241. See Branch, supra note 236, at 149. 
 242. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1982). 
 243. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(holding that the selective exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employer’s 
generally comprehensive prescription plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII and the PDA). 
 244. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (a woman’s 
decision to care for a child is not covered by the PDA); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 
F. Supp. 1487, 1492-93 (D. Colo. 1997) (a plaintiff must show “she was pregnant at or near 
the time of the alleged discrimination”); Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the 
Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (alleged discrimination was caused by 
plaintiff’s desire to take a childcare leave, not a pregnancy leave; that sort of discrimination 
is not covered by the PDA). 
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example, in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. the District Court of Colorado 
determined that a plaintiff must show that “she was pregnant at or near the 
time of the alleged discrimination.”245  The court determined that the 
plaintiff was a part of the protected class because her termination occurred 
less than three months after she gave birth and only three weeks after her 
medical leave had ended.246
Breast-feeding cases have faced similar problems.  Courts have held that 
breast-feeding is not covered by the PDA, the ADA, or as a sex-plus 
characteristic under Title VII.
  It is unclear where courts will draw the line, 
but it is clear that it would be difficult to use the PDA to protect women 
with childcare concerns when the time period covered by the PDA is so 
short and the statute is so necessarily tied to the physical act of childbirth. 
247  Courts have characterized breast-feeding 
as outside the purview of the PDA.248  Some courts have, however, 
suggested that breast-feeding be specifically included in Title VII or the 
PDA,249 and other courts have suggested that a breast-feeding and breast-
pumping accommodations statute would be a positive step forward.250
The FMLA is limited in many obvious ways, most notably in that it does 
not apply to all American workers and provides for only unpaid leave.
  But 
regardless of whether judges have thought that a new or existing statute 
should cover breast-feeding, it is, as of now, not covered by any statute, 
and the existing laws are not broad enough to include breast-feeding under 
their canopies of protection. 
251  
In those ways it is limited by design—for the statute to make it through 
Congress it had to be limited.  According to some, the FMLA is limited in 
other important ways as well: it sends implicit messages to American 
women that women are dependent on men, that men are society’s 
breadwinners, that women are the primary caretakers of children, and that 
women are less dedicated in the workplace than their male counterparts.252
 
 245. 960 F. Supp. at 1493. 
  
The FMLA’s drafters may not have intended these limitations, but because 
of the compromises made in order to pass the statute, the FMLA may have 
emerged in a form that despite good intentions, does almost as much harm 
as it does good. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See supra notes 100-131 and accompanying text. 
 248. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
 249. See Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wallace, 789 
F. Supp. at 870. 
 250. See Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
 251. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
 252. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 441-45. 
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The FMLA also contains the cultural values of the government that 
enacted it.253  In 1993 when the FMLA was enacted, the country was at the 
height of new momism, according to Susan J. Douglas and Meredith M. 
Michaels, authors of THE MOMMY MYTH.254  New momism dictates that 
mothers are the best primary caretakers of their children and that in order to 
be a good mother, a woman must devote all of her time, energy, and 
attention to her child.255  “The new momism does not demand that a 
woman stay at home with her children, but instead asserts that women have 
been to the workforce and now should make the ‘right’ choice to stay at 
home with their children.”256  Douglas and Michaels argue that these 
heightened ideals are bad for mothers, particularly working mothers.257  
According to Douglas and Michaels, new momism began in the 1970s and 
progressed through the celebrity mothers and sensationalized fear of child 
abduction and molestation in daycare of the 1980s to the fear of germs and 
perfection of the heightened standards of motherhood in the 1990s.258
 
 253. See id. at 441. 
  In 
 254. See id. at 434. 
 255. See id. at 431-32.  Douglas and Michaels describe new-momism as 
the insistence that no woman is complete or fulfilled unless she has kids, that 
women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and that to be a remotely 
decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire physical, psychological, 
emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her children.  The new momism is a 
highly romanticized and yet demanding view of motherhood in which the 
standards for success are impossible to  meet. 
Shattering ‘The Mommy Myth’, MSNBC, Feb. 5, 2004 (quoting from SUSAN DOUGLAS & 
MEREDITH MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT 
HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN, (Simon & Schuster 2004)), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4163361/. 
 256. Dickerson, supra note 99, at 432. 
 257. In an interview with USA TODAY, Douglas said, “[W]orking moms have been 
especially guilt-tripped. . . . The chic thing to do now, though is to be able to work but to 
CHOOSE to stay home with your children.  That is seen as the morally superior thing to do.  
But very few mothers can do that.  Most moms work because they have to.”  Peterson, supra 
note 41, at 6D.  But see Suzanne Venker, Angry Mothers Get Back to the Office!, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, May 7, 2004, available at  
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/venker200405071112.asp  (“Unfortunately, 
Douglas and Michaels have not done their homework.  If they had, they’d know . . . that 
most women choose to be home with their children.  Of course, the authors do not accept 
this fact (‘For most mothers, work is an absolute necessity’) and thus resent anyone who 
disagrees with their philosophy.”). 
 258. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 432-34.  In an interview with SALON, Douglas said, 
[T]he media discovered that the family was changing in the late ‘70s, early ‘80s, 
and children became a big story.  But children became an even bigger story, and 
so you got these media panics.  You got sensationalized stories about children in 
danger: Razor blades in Halloween candy, pajamas that caught on fire by 
themselves almost, day-care centers staffed by Satanists and pedophiles.  That was 
all out of proportion to the risks that real children were facing, but it made 
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an interview, Douglas explained what a mother is expected to do in order to 
be considered a good mother. 
We have gone back to the doting mom of the 1950s, to June Cleaver.  But 
the standards are even higher.  She was not supposed to pipe Mozart near 
her womb so this perfectly tuned child came out, or drill him with flash 
cards when he was [six] months old or expect him to read THE ILIAD by 
the time he was [four].  Later she did not have to drive him [ten] hours 
round trip to a soccer match or do endless arts and crafts with him while 
building a fun house in the back yard. 
We are expected to actually be in our children’s heads, knowing what 
they need before they need it.  God forbid that if a child is riding in a car 
that he should not have a pack of educational toys with him so that he will 
have an enriching experience.259
By the 1990s the new momism was perfected, and its heightened ideals of 
motherhood were influencing American society; it was then that the weak 
FMLA was passed.
 
260
The values of new momism are echoed in the assumptions and effects of 
the FMLA.
 
261  The FMLA casts mothers in the role of primary caretaker of 
children.262  Under the structure set up by the FMLA, the mother is the 
more financially and culturally able parent to take unpaid leave following 
the birth of a child.263  If the mother is the parent who stays at home 
immediately following the birth of a child, she naturally learns more about 
taking care of the child, automatically placing the father in a position of 
secondary care.264  Though a first-time mother and father may start out 
with the same level of parenting skills, the perception is that mothers are 
more skilled, which often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.265
 
mothers terrified to let their kids out of their sight.  So fear was important. 
  “Because 
the patterns of care-taking are established in the days and weeks following 
the birth or adoption of the child, the FMLA ensures that the burden for 
  The other thing was fantasy.  Again, the media responded to women when we 
were looking for role models.  Who’s a better role model, in some ways, than a 
celebrity mom because celebrity mothers were working outside the home, but they 
were having children.  So we got the explosion in the ‘80s of the celebrity mom 
profile, something you just didn’t see in ‘70s women’s magazines. 
Amy Reiter, The Mommy Mystique, SALON, Feb. 19, 2004, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/feature/2004/02/19/mommy_myth/index.html. 
 259. Peterson, supra note 41, at 6D. 
 260. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 434-35. 
 261. See id. at 441-42. 
 262. See id. at 442. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. at 443. 
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caregiving falls on the mother.”266  By the time a father attempts to be a 
caregiver, he has already been put into a secondary role.267
The FMLA assumes that a secondary source of income exists that will 
allow leave-takers to take an unpaid leave of absence from work.
 
268  The 
FMLA presumes that mothers are not the breadwinners of their families; it 
presumes that women are dependent on their husbands.269  The traditional 
family structure is embedded in the FMLA, and the traditional structure is 
reinforced and encouraged by the new momism.  The traditional family 
structure remains an ideal of American society and one of the tenets of the 
male-centric job model even though it is not the norm—most families do 
not operate in the 1950s paradigm of working father, stay-at-home mother, 
two kids, and a dog.270  By assuming that families are structured in a 
traditional way, the FMLA largely ignores single parents and even dual-
earner households where the woman’s income is as integral to family 
survival as the man’s.271  And because more women than men take leave 
under the FMLA, the lack of compensation affects women more than it 
affects men.272  Unpaid leave undervalues women by assuming that women 
can afford to take leave “because [their incomes are] not essential to their 
livelihood” and “that a mother’s financial contribution and involvement in 
the workplace are insignificant.”273  Women are worth less than men in the 
labor market because concepts of traditional sex roles continue to result in 
the assignment of responsibility for childcare to women.274
The FMLA also perpetuates the stereotype that women are less 
committed to their jobs, because their focus is on their families.
 
275  The 
time when most women have children coincides with the crucial years of 
advancement (to tenure, partner, vice-president, or management, for 
example).276  Employers assume from past experience that their employees 
will follow gender norms and the women will be less committed to the 
workforce while the men strive to get ahead to support their growing 
families.277
 
 266. Id. 
  Women are penalized because their employers perceive that 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. at 442. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. at 444. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Branch, supra note 236, at 119. 
 275. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 443. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
REUTER_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:20 PM 
20xx] DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE  135 
they will have children and leave the workforce, at least temporarily.278  
“By ensuring that the mother of the child is the parent who takes family 
leave, the FMLA substantiates, validates, and reinforces the logical 
gambles that employers take that women are not committed to the 
workforce.”279  The FMLA’s intention was to help women balance their 
work and family obligations, but it has also “served to perpetuate the 
underlying stereotypes that are the basis of workplace discrimination.”280
In 1994, Kathryn Branch wrote these hopeful words in a note about 
gender inequities: 
  
Though the FMLA may have helped women in certain practical ways, it 
has also reinforced and validated the work-family model that places women 
at a disadvantage to men in the workplace. 
Family leave is a gender-neutral concept; its purpose is to strengthen the 
valuation of family in our country by allowing all willing parents the 
opportunity to make family commitments.  Passage of the FMLA allows 
men the option to take time to care for children without penalty that most 
fathers would not otherwise have.  Although cultural taboos against men 
taking paternity leave still exist, the FMLA is one step towards changing 
public perception of appropriate gender roles and valuation of the 
family.281
Branch’s words reflect the mission of the FMLA as stated in its 
preamble.  But that mission statement was not fulfilled, and, unfortunately 
and perhaps through self-fulfilling prophecy, the FMLA’s critics were 
right, or at least not wrong.  The FMLA did not dramatically help women, 
or at least not in any appreciable way; instead it reaffirmed and perpetuated 
the status quo.
 
282  By effectively preserving the status quo, the FMLA 
“perpetuates the legal subordination of women.”283  The FMLA guarantees 
a floor of parental accommodation beneath which covered employers may 
not dip, but it does not “challenge the workplace or family structures that 
were in place prior [sic] its passage; instead its embedded assumptions, 
norms and values perpetuate the mother as the only caregiver of children, 
which is the status quo.”284
 
 278. See id. at 443-44. 
  The status quo subordinates women, and 
legislation like the FMLA recognizes that subordination is a problem but 
 279. Id. at 444. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Branch, supra note 236, at 141. 
 282. See Dickerson, supra note 99, at 444. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 445. 
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does nothing to remedy it.285
C. Critiques of the Current Statutory Framework 
 
This section builds on the discussion in the previous section and points 
out some of the harms caused by the statutory framework—as written or as 
applied.  Major gaps in coverage exist.  For example, Title VII and the 
FMLA do not apply to all employers or all employees because of 
requirements about the size of the employer and the number of hours the 
employee has worked in the last year.  But this section is more concerned 
with the less obvious holes in coverage and the ways those holes affect 
women.  Subtle forms of discrimination are not adequately protected 
against by the current statutory scheme.  This section takes up the biases 
within the courts themselves, the realities of the workplace, and the 
phenomenon of covering to show the ways in which the status quo is 
harmful to women. 
1.  The Harm of the Status Quo 
a. Biases in Judicial Opinions 
Biases and embedded assumptions about mothers and pregnant women 
are not limited to home and the workplace (and perhaps the statutes), but 
are also found in judicial opinions.  Such assumptions are not only present 
in older cases—where one might think they would be more prevalent—but 
are found in recent cases as well.  In Satty, one of the Supreme Court cases 
that led to the PDA, the Court wrote, “[T]hat holding does not allow us to 
read [the statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in 
such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of 
their different role.”286  The Court assumes that women and men have 
different roles to play in society.  But in Satty, a pre-PDA case, this 
embedded assumption about women is not so shocking.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court’s embedded assumptions in Phillips v. Marietta Corp., a 
1971 pre-PDA case, were not unexpected.287  There the Court asserted that 
“[t]he existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably 
more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could 
arguably be a basis for distinction under [Title VII].”288
 
 285. See id. 
  What was ahead 
of its time was Justice Marshall’s concurrence where he wrote that the 
 286. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977). 
 287. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 288. Id. at 544. 
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Court could not use its beliefs about the proper role of women as a basis to 
permit discrimination.289
What is more shocking is that in a post-PDA world where most women 
work, the same embedded assumptions and biases can still be seen in court 
opinions.  For example, in Wallace, a 1990 case, the court commented that 
the plaintiff needed leave because of “her inability to wean her child from 
breast-feeding.”
 
290
Another more recent case that exhibits a court’s (or perhaps an entire 
circuit’s) biases and embedded assumptions is Guglietta v. Meredith 
Corp.
  In that snide comment the court appears to be 
criticizing the plaintiff’s mothering skills.  Because this comment could be 
interpreted as belittling the plaintiff for her poor parenting and thus 
perpetuating high, almost impossible-to-attain standards for motherhood, it 
could be linked to the phenomenon of new momism discussed earlier in 
Part II.  The comment could also be seen as looking down on mothers and 
relegating motherhood to a realm other than that of the male workplace and 
definitely inferior to it.  Either way, the comment contains embedded 
assumptions about motherhood. 
291  In Guglietta the plaintiff characterized herself as a “woman with 
a child” for the purposes of her Title VII claim, but the court disagreed and 
thought a better characterization was “woman with childcare 
difficulties.”292
2.  Harm in the Workplace 
  Following a thought process similar to the Seventh 
Circuit’s pregnancy jurisprudence, the court reasoned that a woman cannot 
be discriminated against for having a child but she can be discriminated 
against for having a real child with real needs (such as the need for an adult 
to be at home at night while that child is sleeping).  This creates a bias 
against all women with children because one can assume that all children 
have needs and that those needs will, from time to time, create childcare 
problems for their parents.  Thus, “woman with a child” as differentiated 
from “woman with childcare difficulties” is an arbitrary distinction that 
discriminates against women. 
The ways in which a more family-friendly statutory scheme would 
benefit employees, and perhaps society at large, have been discussed 
exhaustively in this Comment, but there has been little discussion of what 
the effect would be on employers.  Discrimination against pregnant women 
 
 289. See id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 290. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
 291. 301 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 292. Id. at 214. 
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and mothers and un-family-friendly work environments may actually be 
harmful to business as well as to employees.  In England, just forty-seven 
percent of women return to work at the companies where they worked 
before they became pregnant.293  Some companies, however, have created 
family-friendly policies that improved their retention rates.294  For 
example, at BT, a British telecom giant, ninety-nine percent of its female 
employees return to work at the company after their maternity leaves.295  
BT attributes this statistic to its flexible approach to work patterns 
(including allowing employees to work from home) and its generous 
maternity package.296  Flexible policies have been similarly successful in 
the United States.297
There are many ways in which a more family-friendly statutory scheme 
would benefit employers.  Some employers have found that offering 
childcare is a way to attract better employees.
 
298  And other employers 
have learned that family-friendly policies make employees happy, and that 
happy employees make productive employees.299  Take breast-feeding for 
example—breast-pumping accommodation in the workplace is perhaps 
logistically at least the easiest change to effectuate, and it may benefit 
employers.  It is widely known that breast-feeding is good for the mother 
and infant, but adopting policies that enable women to breast-feed their 
children can be economically sound for the employers as well.300  Working 
women who breast-feed their children are less often late to and absent from 
work due to their children because their children are usually healthier.301  
Also, increased productivity and job satisfaction have been seen when 
employers adopt breast-feeding friendly policies.302  By encouraging 
breast-feeding, employers encourage women to stay in the work force, 
reducing turnover.303  And because breast-feeding is so beneficial for both 
the mother and child, it can reduce healthcare costs as well.304
 
 293. Management Issues News, Parent-friendly Policies Boost Maternity Return Rates, 
MANAGEMENT-ISSUES, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.management-
issues.com/display_page.asp?id=2536&section=research. 
  Seeing 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See Dale Neal, Putting Children First Makes Good Business Sense, THE ASHEVILLE 
CITIZEN-TIMES (N.C.), Nov. 14, 2005, at 3W. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 476-77. 
 301. See id. at 477. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See id. at 478. 
 304. See id. at 477-78; see also Roni Rabin, Breast-Feed or Else, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
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employees as parents as well as employees and making room for that in the 
workplace can be as good for employers as it is for the employed. 
An article for the New York Law Journal by Holly English, a practicing 
attorney and author, in which English answered questions from women 
concerned about how having children will affect their legal careers, offers a 
window into what it is like for pregnant women and mothers in the real 
world.305  English’s article depicts the bleak landscape for working women 
who desire to have children.  It is important to note, however, that because 
English’s article is targeted at lawyers, and the law is a particularly 
demanding profession, the landscape presented is extreme.306
One young woman asked English whether getting pregnant after 
working at a law firm for one year would “be off-putting, create havoc at 
the firm, or demonstrate that [she is] not committed.”
  And even 
within the legal profession, there are law firms with family-friendly 
policies that they truly stand behind and enforce.  English’s answers expose 
the biases and stereotypes faced by women and the lack of respect 
employers give anti-discrimination statutes. 
307  English answered 
that although pregnancy discrimination is illegal, it happens all the time, 
and is very difficult to prove.308  English suggested that the young woman 
be aware of that reality and build that awareness into the timing of her 
pregnancy.309  English noted that people running law firms expressed 
frustration to her that women begin work at the firm, get pregnant, and 
leave their jobs.310  “[Legal employers] wind up making assumptions, 
based on past experience, that once a woman has children she will be less 
committed to her job.”311
 
2006, at F1 (science overwhelmingly supports the many benefits of breast-feeding, 
including that breast-fed children are less vulnerable to many infectious diseases). 
  Thus, to be successful, according to English, a 
 305. Holly English, Oh Baby! Pregnancy Discrimination is Illegal, But Then There is 
Reality, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 2004, at 10. 
 306. In 2005, only seventeen percent of partners at major law firms nationwide were 
female. Timothy L. O’Brien, Up the Down Staircase: Why Do So Few Women Reach the 
Top of Big Law Firms?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, Sec. 3 at 1.  “Even those who have 
made it to the top of their profession say that the data shows that women’s legal careers 
involve distinct, often insurmountable hurdles and that those hurdles remain misunderstood 
or underexamined.”  Id. 
 307. English, supra note 305, at 10. 
 308. See id.  According to one attorney, law firms’ problems are centered on 
advancement and retention and those problems are caused by biases, not direct 
discrimination.  See O’Brien, supra note 306, at 1.  Bias is hard to prove.  See John 
Rossheim, If You Suspect Hiring Bias, http://diversity.monster.com/articles/hiringbias/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
 309. See English, supra note 305, at 10. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. 
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woman must conform to the male-centric job model, a model that 
accommodates children only if the parent can afford comprehensive 
childcare and does not intend to spend much time with her children.  In 
fact, a recent study showed that women who leave their law firm jobs to 
take a more active role in childcare often feel pushed into that choice and 
would choose to maintain their careers and their families if the workplace 
were structured to accommodate their needs.312
All of the stereotypes surrounding pregnancy and motherhood may help 
to explain why motherhood has such a strong negative effect on a woman’s 
income.
 
313  The salary gap for mothers has increased, though the difference 
between the salaries of men and women in general has decreased.314  And 
some studies show that this pay gap is related to the differences in childcare 
responsibilities, not education and experience.315  Interestingly, several 
courts have held that childcare is gender-neutral.316  But this is often not 
the perception that employers hold, and “[t]he impact of these perceptions 
upon the employment of mothers cannot be addressed when the gender 
neutrality of parenthood is the court’s emphasis.”317  Though the gender 
neutrality of childcare might be a worthy goal, it is not a reality, as 
reflected in the large wage gap experienced by mothers.318
To another woman, English wrote, “[I]f you start a job and then 
immediately or soon thereafter leave on maternity leave, asking to return 
on a part-time basis, partners will resent it.  That’s a fact, leaving aside that 
they can’t discriminate against you on the basis of pregnancy.”
 
319
 
 312. See O’Brien, supra note 306, at 1. 
  English 
appears to be saying that though the partners may not discriminate in a way 
that is actionable, the consequence of maternity leave, followed by asking 
for a part-time schedule will be a cooling attitude towards the employee.  
Thus, by asking for the accommodations needed to be both a mother and a 
worker, a woman limits her career choices by alienating her employer. This 
is discrimination, but a plaintiff is not likely to be successful in a suit based 
on this subtle form.  The tide may be changing, however: the EEOC issued 
a charge determination for this sort of discrimination in the case of Laurie 
 313. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 313. 
 314. See id. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997); Record 
v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. For the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 317. Magid, supra note 61, at 833. 
 318. Mothers are more likely than fathers to bear the primary responsibility for childcare.  
See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 312.  Women perform approximately eighty percent of the 
childcare for their families.  See id. at 313. 
 319. English, supra note 305, at 10. 
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Anne Freeman, mentioned in the Introduction to this Comment. 
As seen in Freeman’s case, when women become pregnant, become 
mothers, or ask for a reduced or more flexible schedule, certain stereotypes 
are triggered.320  “Studies indicate that once one of these three events 
occurs, a woman is more likely to be viewed as a ‘low-competence 
caregiver rather than as a high-competence business woman.’”321
a.  Covering 
  Covering 
is one tactic used by women to try to avoid the negative stereotypes 
associated with pregnancy and motherhood. 
The current statutory scheme encourages women to cover, subsuming 
their true identities and perpetuating the male-centric job model.  Covering 
is attempting to make an undesirable characteristic less obtrusive.322
This discrimination does not aim at groups as a whole.  Rather it aims at 
the subset of the group that refuses to cover, that is, to assimilate to 
dominant norms.  And for the most part, existing civil rights laws do not 
protect individuals against such covering demands.  The question of our 
time is whether we should understand this new discrimination to be a 
harm and, if so, whether the remedy is legal or social in nature.
  
Homosexuality, disability, age, and motherhood are examples of stigmas 
that people attempt to cover.  Yale Law Professor Kenji Yoshino’s notion 
of covering describes “a subtler form of discrimination.” 
323
Because this type of discrimination does not affect broad, easily identified 
groups, it is more difficult to see and to regulate. 
 
Discrimination against pregnant women, mothers, and caregivers is 
exactly the type of subtle discrimination anticipated by Yoshino.  Working 
mothers do not fit into the current workplace’s male-centric job model, 
which is based on an outdated version of the nuclear family.324  The 
workplace today remains structured around the “ideal worker”—an 
employee with no childcare responsibilities who is able to work forty plus 
hours per week year round and work overtime on little or no notice.325
 
 320. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 314. 
  
“Employers generally accept the importance of ‘face time,’ regardless 
 321. Id. (citations omitted). 
 322. Covering was first termed by Erving Goffman in his book STIGMA, written in 1963.  
See Yoshino, supra note 144, at 32.  The term was then adopted by Kenji Yoshino, a Yale 
law professor, in his recent book, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS.  
See id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 310. 
 325. Id. 
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whether it correlates to higher quality work.  The privileges that non-
mothers enjoy in the workplace are simply taken for granted.”326
Enforcement of Title VII and the PDA has not stopped women from 
feeling the need to cover.  In fact, the PDA has only served to enforce that 
need.  According to the Seventh Circuit in Maldonado, a woman can be 
discriminated against because of the side effects of her pregnancy though 
not simply for the fact that she is pregnant.
  Thus, in 
order to succeed and fit within the male-centric job model, women are 
forced to cover—subsuming their pregnancies and their roles as mothers 
and caregivers in order to appear more like the “ideal worker.” 
327  Magid argued that the 
court’s holding in Maldonado encourages women to hide their pregnancies 
from their employers for fear that one small inconvenience to an employer 
could cost her job.328  And discrimination, which occurs after a woman 
gives birth, perhaps due to breast-feeding or childcare, is generally not 
covered by the PDA.329
Clay v. Holy Cross Hospital is an example of how covering can hurt 
women when they decide to sue for pregnancy discrimination.  In Clay, the 
plaintiff initially concealed her pregnancy from her employer.
  Thus in order to avoid these unactionable forms of 
discrimination, women must cover—they must make sure that they present 
themselves as workers first and women second. 
330  Then, 
when she sued under the PDA, a major issue was whether or not the 
employer knew of her pregnancy at the time it selected her for the 
reduction-in-force.  Had the plaintiff not tried to “keep things quiet,”331 she 
would not have faced this hurdle in her case.  During her deposition, 
however, when the plaintiff was asked why she did not send in her 
maternity leave request earlier, the plaintiff said, “[B]ecause I was trying to 
keep things quiet.  I didn’t want those who were not friends of mine to be 
aware of the fact that I was pregnant, so that’s why I waited.”332
And if the PDA is even further stripped of its meaning by ever-
narrowing decisions, employers will realize the limited bite of the PDA and 
accordingly allow the stereotypes and biases the Act was designed to 
  The 
plaintiff hid her pregnancy from her employer in order to avoid 
discrimination, but by doing so she hurt her chances of winning in a suit 
when the discrimination (arguably) did occur. 
 
 326. Id. at 314. 
 327. See Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 328. See Magid, supra note 61, at 831. 
 329. See supra notes 100-131, 176-211 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 331. Id. at 1007. 
 332. Id. at 1007 n.6. 
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eliminate infiltrate the employment decision making process.333
3.  Proposals for Change 
  The 
situation could worsen, forcing more and more women to cover and 
effectively causing an effect opposite to the one the PDA was intended to 
create. 
Several of the scholars discussed in this Comment offer proposals to 
make it easier for pregnant women to have children and careers without 
facing discrimination and ultimately to make women and men equal in the 
workplace and at home.  Julie Manning Magid’s proposal does not involve 
a new statute or even an amendment to an existing statute.  Instead, Magid 
argues for a broader reading of the PDA; one that does not use artificially 
high evidentiary standards or read the two clauses of the PDA together.334  
The crux of Magid’s argument is that the stereotypes and biases the PDA 
was intended to eliminate inform the evidentiary standards used in PDA 
cases.335  Magid believes that by examining the standards as they are now 
and adjusting them, the PDA can achieve its intended goals.336
Debbie N. Kaminer’s article focused on the work-family conflict and 
proposed a parental accommodation model based on section 701(j) of Title 
VII, which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace.
  A change 
in evidentiary standards would afford pregnant women and mothers 
considerably more protection from discrimination, but such a change would 
be difficult to effectuate.  It would involve changing the habits and attitudes 
of judges and, in some circuits, ignoring precedent, and thus it may be 
wishful thinking. 
337  
Kaminer is attracted to section 701(j) because it balances the needs of 
employer and employee and only requires accommodation when the 
employer will not suffer undue hardship.338  “This balancing approach will 
provide increased flexibility for working parents, while ensuring that any 
cost to employers is not overly burdensome.”339  One concern of the 
accommodation approach set forth by Kaminer is that it sends the message 
that mothers are asking for special treatment.340
 
 333. See Magid, supra note 61, at 833. 
  Kaminer’s reply to this 
concern is that formal equality has failed to protect working parents and 
 334. Id. at 855-56. 
 335. See id. at 835. 
 336. See id. 
 337. See Kaminer, supra note 15, at 308. 
 338. See id. at 309. 
 339. Id. at 364. 
 340. See id. at 334. 
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something else needs to be done to give additional protection.341  Kaminer 
does not address the feasibility of her plan other than to say that it would be 
cost-effective in the long term.342
Kathryn Branch’s proposal begins with the idea that men and women are 
different.
  Work-family conflicts warranting 
accommodations are likely more prevalent than religious concerns 
warranting accommodation.  Thus, it might be interesting to know what 
effect the larger number of accommodations required to deal with work-
family conflicts would have on the workings of the statute.  Whether or not 
the logistics of this proposal are practical, it presents an interesting new 
way to look at the accommodation of working parents. 
343  She expresses concern that a woman who desires to succeed 
in the workplace should not have to emulate a man.344  A woman should 
not have to cover in order to succeed—she should be able to be feminine 
and successful.345  The goals of Branch’s proposal are (1) to establish 
institutional and structural support for families so that simultaneous 
dedication to family and career are both feasible and permissible; (2) the 
rejection of prescriptive sex roles and expectations; and (3) an increase in 
the value American culture gives to nurturing work such as childcare.346  
Branch suggests a variety of ends to this goal and does not theorize one 
coherent piece of legislation.347  She argues that the primary component of 
an effective solution is “a shift in the norms and ideals of American 
society.”348  To accomplish this she suggests changing the assumptions on 
which existing legislation is based and legislating on issues addressed to 
sex inequities.349  Proactive legislation would include government-
mandated provisions for non-gender-based childcare and non-gender-
specific parental leaves.350  Branch suggests government-sponsored 
programs to help parents devote more time to childcare, such as an 
extension of the school day, and the “re-allocation of work and family time 
over the life cycle” by subsidizing parents with low interest loans so that 
they can spend more time with their children when their children are 
young, and work full-time when their children are grown.351
 
 341. See id. 
  Branch’s 
 342. See id. at 335-36. 
 343. See Branch, supra note 236, at 153-54. 
 344. See id. at 154. 
 345. See id. 
 346. See id. at 155-66. 
 347. See id. at 155-57. 
 348. Id. at 155. 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. at 156. 
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legislative solution attempts to achieve the ambitious goal of changing the 
norms and gender biases underlying American culture. 
During a symposium on work-family conflict in 1999, Joan C. Williams, 
concerned with many of the same issues as Branch, espoused a “principle 
of proportional work.”352  By that Williams meant that part-time workers 
should get paid in proportion to the amount of work they do, get 
proportional benefits, and receive proportional advancement.353  Williams 
acknowledged that there is a stigma attached to flexible policies, and so 
while many employers already have such policies, few people use them.354  
“So long as these flexible policies are linked with marginalization, in my 
view, they’re merely another way of discrimination.”355  Williams argued 
that the reason gender has proven to be so unbending is the clash between 
the male-centric job model and the norm of parental care.356  A policy of 
proportional work would change the male-centric job model by decreasing 
the importance of face-time and ensuring equal pay for equal work, and 
help both men and women.357
An approach that would be fairly simple to implement is Shana M. 
Christrup’s proposal.  Christrup’s article focused on breast-feeding.  
Logically, her solution, a breast-pumping accommodation policy, is 
focused solely on the lack of coverage currently afforded to breast-feeding 
in this country.  Christup, however, asserted that a breast-pumping 
accommodation policy would help women and mothers achieve workplace 
equality by permitting women to enter the sphere of continuous 
employment and men to enter the sphere of childcare.
  Williams’s policy proposal is more discrete 
and thus more workable than Branch’s, but it would still be very difficult to 
implement. 
358
 
 352. Joan C. Williams, Symposium Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict 
and What to Do About It, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 856 (2000) [hereinafter Williams, 
Symposium]. 
  Although a 
breast-milk pumping policy does not preserve the important mother-child 
bond formed by breast-feeding, many of the health advantages to women 
and children are retained.  Also, men are able to take a larger role in 
childcare because they too can engage in the bonding activity of feeding 
the baby.  Breast-pumping policies promote equality by enabling women to 
return to work quickly after the birth of a child and giving men more of a 
 353. See id. 
 354. See id. at 856-57. 
 355. Id. at 857. 
 356. See id. 
 357. See id. at 858. 
 358. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 497. 
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role in childrearing.359  Breast-pumping is also a more cost-effective 
solution for employers than having women stay home to breast-feed their 
children.360
Another approach is the Draft of a Bill to Protect Against Discrimination 
on the Basis of Familial Caregiver Status (“Family-Friendly Workplace 
Act”) proposed by the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York.
  Christrup’s proposal is relatively easy to implement and could 
have wide-reaching social and economic results. 
361  
The basic premise of the statute is to add family caregiver status to the list 
of protected classes in state and local statutes.362  Family caregiver is 
defined broadly in the statute.363  The statute would apply to disparate 
impact and disparate treatment claims.364  The statute would address all 
employers with fifteen or more employers,365 and is designed so that it 
could be added to any existing state or local anti-discrimination statute.366
These proposals are all different, but they all have similar goals: not just 
to halt discrimination but to change the social norms, biases, and embedded 
assumptions about women that result in discrimination.  In Part III, I will 
outline my proposal for change. 
  
This anti-discrimination legislation proposal is workable, practical, and 
directed at alleviating the subtle discrimination faced by working parents.  
In some ways it would do on a local level for caregivers what the PDA did 
on a national level for pregnant women. 
III.  THE PARENTAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 
The current statutory scheme is insufficient to protect pregnant women 
and mothers from discrimination in the workplace.  Because of the statutes 
themselves and the narrow way they have been interpreted by many courts, 
the current statutory scheme does not have the power to stop the subtle 
forms of discrimination common in the workplace today.  And women 
cannot truly be free to make autonomous decisions about work and family 
until the male-centric job model is revised and the stereotypes of women 
fade.  Legal thinkers and organizations promoting work and family argue 
 
 359. See id. 
 360. See id. at 499-501. 
 361. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc., Draft of a Bill to Protect against 
Discrimination on the Basis of Familial Caregiver Status, available at 
www.antibiaslaw.com/familyfriendly.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. § 2(a)-(c). 
 364. See id. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See id. 
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for a broader reading of the existing statutes.  For example, Magid argues 
that the PDA has a role in protecting women from having to choose 
between a job and a family and that its role can be realized “through a 
continual reexamination of the protections afforded by the Act and how 
those protections can be accomplished in a changing work 
environment.”367  Magid’s proscription involves a broader definition of 
direct evidence and asks courts to apply a version of the PDA more in line 
with Congress’s intent.368
[t]he growth in both pregnancy discrimination claims and claims by men 
and women who face discrimination because of their family care 
responsibilities demonstrates a continuing need for vigorous enforcement 
of Title VII, and public education for employees and employers about 
how the law works.  Further, the EEOC should explore how Title VII can 
be used to challenge discriminatory employment practices related to an 
individual’s family responsibilities that may not be covered by the 
PDA.
  The National Partnership for Work and Families 
argues modestly that 
369
These ideas for reform would be positive steps, but they are hard to 
effectuate and would not have the reach that a new statute would.  Also, 
they would not attack the embedded assumptions and underlying biases and 
stereotypes that result in discrimination and, therefore, would not do 
enough to establish equality between men and women in the workplace and 
the home.  I suggest that the law needs to go even further—the existing 
statutes are not enough. 
 
Branch, Christrup, Williams, and the Anti-Discrimination Center of 
Metro New York all argue for new legislation, but their proposals are very 
different.  Christrup’s breast-pumping accommodation proposal focuses on 
one aspect of the problem—lack of accommodation for breast-feeding 
mothers—and devises a solution that would be relatively easy to 
implement.370
Branch does not argue for one specific legislative solution; instead she 
puts forth a variety of possible legislative actions that would work together 
  Christrup’s practical plan may also effectuate a larger 
change by permitting women to return to work earlier while still providing 
a valuable resource to their children.  If women had more involvement in 
the workforce generally, some of employers’ fears and stereotypes about 
female employees may be dissipated. 
 
 367. Magid, supra note 61, at 855. 
 368. See id. at 856. 
 369. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 19, at 13. 
 370. See Christrup, supra note 54, at 494-97. 
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to create change.371
Williams’s proposal, of pay and benefits proportional to the amount of 
work done by a person, is specific and targeted at improving the situation 
for women in the workplace and changing the attitudes about gender that 
result in discrimination.
  Branch is focused on giving families support so that 
work and family can coexist, abandoning the traditional sex roles, and 
increasing the value given to nurturing work, such as childcare.  Rather 
than putting forth a specific plan, Branch mentions many possible ideas 
that would further her three goals. 
372  It could go a long way towards changing the 
male-centric job model by changing the way employers think about face-
time.373
The Family-Friendly Workplace Act would give caregivers (male or 
female) who have been discriminated against at work a cause of action.  
The legislation is proposed for implementation on the state and local level, 
and it is more likely to be implemented on those levels than it would be on 
the national level, particularly because it specifically includes so many 
employers.  It might not solve the problems identified in this Comment 
about evidentiary standards, because courts may still institute heightened 
evidentiary standards.  It appears that courts may read the legislation to 
protect only those employees discriminated against purely based on their 
status as a caregiver, rather than because of the realities that come with 
being a caregiver.  Nevertheless, this proposal takes meaningful and 
realistic steps toward making men and women truly equal at home and in 
the workplace, by protecting them equally from this type of discrimination.  
An anti-discrimination statute without an accommodation component may 
not do enough to change the biases and embedded assumptions that 
underlie discrimination against working mothers, however.  There is merit 
to each of these proposals, and I am convinced by them that a legislative 
solution is needed to cure the many problems lurking beneath persistent, if 
subtle, discrimination. 
  Making face-time less important to employers would put women 
(and men) with childcare responsibilities at less of a disadvantage in the 
workplace. 
Because the existing legislation is not enough, I propose a new piece of 
legislation—The Parental Discrimination Act. 
The Parental Discrimination Act 
1.  It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee 
who is a pregnant woman, mother, or father on the basis of the 
 
 371. See Branch, supra note 236, at 155-66. 
 372. See Williams Symposium, supra note 352, at 856. 
 373. See id. 
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employee’s status as a pregnant woman, mother, or father.  An employer 
may defend on the grounds that sex or pregnancy status is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the regular operation 
of that business. 
2.  It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against a female 
employee on the basis of illness or changing biological requirements due 
to pregnancy or time needed to give birth, recover from giving birth, 
breast-feed, or pump breast milk.  An employer may not discriminate 
against a female employee who needs reasonable accommodations (e.g. 
breaks during the day to pump breast milk in a private room) to 
accommodate breast-feeding or breast pumping. 
3.  It shall be illegal for an employer to discriminate against parents on the 
basis of their status as parents or because they need reasonable 
accommodations in order to accommodate a job and a family.  
Reasonable accommodations include, but are not limited to, the use of 
sick days to take care of children, infrequent breaks from work to pick up 
a sick or otherwise needy child or to take a child to the doctor, minor 
adjustments in work schedule to accommodate childcare, and occasional 
phone calls at work to deal with childcare issues. 
4.  In order to prove discrimination under this Act, a plaintiff need not 
show that he or she was treated differently than similarly situated 
employees of the opposite sex.  This standard is unreasonable, when only 
women can give birth and lactate.  For example, a lactating woman who 
files a discrimination suit under this Act need only show that she was 
treated unfairly when compared to how non-lactating employees were 
treated. 
The purpose of this legislation on a “micro” level is to make it easier for 
women to participate in the work sphere and for men to participate in the 
home sphere.  But the larger purpose of this statute is ultimately to change 
attitudes about gender in the workplace.  Men should be free from the 
stigma attached to taking family leave or staying home with their children.  
Women should not feel that their jobs are in jeopardy if they choose to 
become pregnant and take leave granted to them by the FMLA or an 
employer’s family-friendly policy.  Like Branch’s proposal, the Parental 
Discrimination Act sweeps broadly, but its four points are targeted at 
patching the holes in coverage identified throughout this Comment.  This 
proposal is not an accommodation policy, nor is it narrowly focused on 
formal equality. 
Section 1 of the proposed Parental Discrimination Act clarifies the 
protections already theoretically granted by Title VII and the PDA.  Section 
2 broadens those protections to include the logical realities related to 
pregnancy and childbirth.  Section 3 prevents employers from 
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discriminating against parents who need reasonable grants of flexibility to 
accommodate their childcare responsibilities while maintaining their 
careers.  Section 3 also takes aim at the male-centric job model and 
employees’ need to cover by encouraging acceptance of employees’ 
outside roles into the conception of the worker.  Section 4 takes aim at the 
heightened evidentiary standards required by some courts and complained 
of in Magid’s article, on the premise that more Title VII and PDA plaintiffs 
would be successful if the standards required of them were attainable. 
Through this forward-thinking legislation, women’s differences are 
accounted for and an attempt is made to give men access to the home 
sphere as women are given increased access to the work sphere on their 
own terms.  Further, the Parental Discrimination Act may benefit 
employers by encouraging women to remain in the workforce continuously 
and by creating happier and therefore more productive employees, while at 
the same time providing immeasurable benefits to parents and children.  
The number of employers affected by the proposal, however, would 
determine the scope of its effect.  If the Parental Discrimination Act were 
applied to all employers, the change would be dramatic; but even if it were 
only applied to a subset of employers and employees (like the FMLA), it 
would create a significant positive change. 
CONCLUSION 
New legislation is needed to grapple with the more subtle forms of 
discrimination against pregnant women and mothers still prevalent in the 
workplace today.  But that legislation must not only deal with the surface 
problem—discrimination—it must also delve under the surface to tackle 
the underlying biases, embedded assumptions, and stereotypes that inform 
such discrimination.  Though my proposal is unlikely to be implemented 
given the current political regime, it would make great strides toward the 
goals of changing the way society thinks about gender and parenting. 
 
